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Patient injury is a predictable feature of health care, particularly 
in hospitals, in the United States and elsewhere.  Since publication of 
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report To Err Is Human in 2000,1 pa-
tient safety has come to the forefront of U.S. health care.  The IOM’s 
projection of 44,000 to 98,000 deaths per year due to hospital errors, 
and hundreds of thousands of avoidable injuries and extra days of 
hospitalization,2 fueled the patient-safety movement in the United 
States.3  Ten years after the IOM report, the level of adverse events in 
hospitals has not improved in any major way.  A recent HealthGrades 
analysis of Medicare data estimates that more than 230,000 hospital 
deaths from 2007 to 2009 could have been prevented within the Med-
icare population alone.4  A study of ten North Carolina hospitals con-
 
1 INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN:  BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. 
Kohn et al. eds., 2000). 
2 Id. at 26-27. 
3 See CHARLES VINCENT, PATIENT SAFETY 25 (Wiley-Blackwell, 2d ed. 2010) (2006) 
(“Without doubt the publication of th[e IOM] report was the single most important 
spur to the development of patient safety, catapulting it into public and political 
awareness and galvanizing political and professional will at the highest levels in the 
United States.”). 
4 KRISTIN REED & RICK MAY, HEALTHGRADES, THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL HEALTH-
GRADES HOSPITAL QUALITY IN AMERICA STUDY 2 (2010), available at http:// 
www.healthgrades.com/business/img/HealthGradesHospitalQualityInAmericaStudy2
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cluded that the rate of patient harm from medical care had not de-
creased substantially over a six-year period ending in December 2007.5 
Analysis of patient safety rests on four basic propositions.  First, 
patient injury (ranging from minor injuries to death) is a recurring 
feature of health care and negatively affects roughly one in every ten 
patients, according to a systematic review of the literature.6  Findings 
by the Inspector General within the Medicare context support this es-
timated patient-injury rate.7  As these statistics attest, patient injury 
eludes easy solutions. 
Second, physicians (and the hospitals in which they practice) all 
too often continue to practice bad medicine in spite of what is known 
about good medical practice.8  While hospital care is indeed compli-
cated, it is also poorly coordinated and poorly managed in many hos-
pitals.9  Hospital policing of adverse events remains inadequate,10 even 
 
010.pdf.  The authors found that, while hospital quality had improved, the difference 
between the best (“5-star rated”) and worst (“1-star rated”) hospitals was significant.  Id. 
at 11-12.  For instance, the probability of dying in a 5-star hospital was roughly 70% 
lower than in a 1-star facility.  Id.  The authors concluded that of the more than 
230,000 preventable deaths, over half could be attributed to four prevalent medical 
diagnoses:  sepsis, pneumonia, respiratory failure, and heart failure.  Id. 
5 Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Temporal Trends in Rates of Patient Harm Resulting 
from Medical Care, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2124, 2127 (2010). 
6 E.N. de Vries et al., The Incidence and Nature of In-Hospital Adverse Events:  A 
Systematic Review, 17 QUAL. & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 216, 216, 222 (2008). 
7 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-06-09-
0090, ADVERSE EVENTS IN HOSPITALS:  NATIONAL INCIDENCE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFI-
CIARIES, at i-ii (2010), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-09-00090.pdf 
(determining that approximately 13.5 percent of Medicare hospital admissions suffered 
an adverse event, with an equal percentage experiencing temporary harm). 
8 Sana M. Al-Khatib and her coauthors offer an illustrative example in the context 
of implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs), which in certain circumstances can 
prevent sudden cardiac death.  Sana M. Al Khatib et al., Non-Evidence-Based ICD Implan-
tations in the United States, 305 JAMA 43, 43 (2011).  The authors divided the use of 
ICDs in hospital patients into two categories:  those uses supported by practice guide-
lines (evidence-based ICDs) and those that were not (non-evidence-based ICDs).  Id.  
They found that the “risk of in-hospital death was significantly higher in patients who 
received a non-evidence-based device than in patients who received an evidence-based 
device.”  Id. at 46.  Despite the evident risk posed by the non-evidence-based ICDs, over 
20% of patients in the study received such devices, with some hospitals using them 
more than 40% of the time.  Id. at 43, 48. 
9 Landrigan and his coauthors observe, 
Despite substantial resource allocation and efforts to draw attention to the      
patient-safety epidemic on the part of government agencies, health care regula-
tors, and private organizations, the penetration of evidence-based safety practic-
es has been quite modest.  For example, only 1.5% of hospitals in the United 
States have implemented a comprehensive system of electronic medical records, 
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though tools, such as computer programs, can ferret out ineffective 
and dangerous care and its causes.11  Some health care systems func-
tion very well in coordinating care and improving outcomes, with the 
Veterans Administration (VA) hospitals serving as the prime exam-
ple,12 and private systems like the Mayo Clinic exemplifying an inte-
grated model with seamless coordination of patient care.13  The chal-
lenge is learning from their successes and applying them to other 
hospitals across the United States. 
Third, medical practice too often ignores effective practices.14 
More research is needed to understand both what works in modern 
medicine and what barriers exist to adopting new practices.  Fourth, 
regulatory tools need to be expanded in order to force more integra-
tion and coordination in health care delivery.15 
 
and only 9.1% have even basic electronic record keeping in place; only 17% 
have computerized provider order entry.  Physicians-in-training and nurses alike 
routinely work hours in excess of those proven to be safe.  Compliance with even 
simple interventions such as hand washing is poor in many centers. 
Landrigan et al., supra note 5, at 2130 (citations omitted).  For further insights, see also 
the astringent comments of Bruce Spitz and John Abramson:  “What other industry 
would tolerate such disregard for professional standards?  Who would buy their prod-
ucts?  What would happen if we learned that defense contractors failed to follow pro-
duction protocol 45 percent of the time and that ninety-eight thousand soldiers died 
annually because of the low quality of their equipment?”  Bruce Spitz & John Abram-
son, When Health Policy Is the Problem:  A Report from the Field, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 327, 329 (2005). 
10 See Mark R. Chassin et al., The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality, 280 JAMA 
1000, 1002-03 (1998) (stating that “[l]arge numbers are injured [in part] because pre-
ventable complications of medical treatment are not averted”). 
11 See generally Barry R. Furrow, Data Mining and Substandard Medical Practice:  The 
Difference Between Privacy, Secrets and Hidden Defects, 51 VILL. L. REV. 803, 810-18 (2006) 
(discussing privacy issues arising with the use of electronic medical records). 
12 See, e.g., PHILLIP LONGMAN, BEST CARE ANYWHERE:  WHY VA HEALTH CARE IS 
BETTER THAN YOURS 1-10 (2007) (confirming that the VA system excels at delivering 
high-quality, well-coordinated, and evidence-based care). 
13 See DOUGLAS MCCARTHY ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, PUB. NO. 1306,  
MAYO CLINIC:  MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAMWORK, PHYSICIAN-LED GOVERNANCE, AND PA-
TIENT-CENTERED CULTURE DRIVE WORLD-CLASS HEALTH CARE 13-14 (2009), available at  
http://www.commonwealth.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Case%20Study/2009/ 
Aug/1306_McCarthy_Mayo_case%20study.pdf (describing the structural and cultural 
pillars undergirding the Mayo Clinic’s integrated model of health care delivery). 
14 See JOHN E. WENNBERG, TRACKING MEDICINE:  A RESEARCHER’S QUEST TO UN-
DERSTAND HEALTH CARE 4 (2010) (“Unwarranted variation in health care delivery—
variation that cannot be explained on the basis of illness, medical evidence, or patient 
preference—is ubiquitous.”).  
15 See generally Angus Corbett et al., Does the Phenomenon of ‘Sociological Citi-
zenship’ Provide a Pathway for Health Care Organizations to Navigate the Gap Be-
tween Expectations and Outcomes in Safety and Quality? 8-13 (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpub-
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The field of patient safety has grown in the United States as a 
subspecialty within health law and policy over the past fifteen years.16  
Patient safety efforts have included both private market-based initia-
tives and state and federal regulatory initiatives to reduce the prob-
lems outlined above.  The general strategies can be summed up in six 
major regulatory categories: 
(1) Standardizing Good Medical Practices.  This method tries to re-
duce medical practice variation by promoting best practices, practice 
guidelines, and research on what works and is cost-effective. 
(2) Tracking Adverse Events in Hospitals.  Collection of adverse event 
data is expanding at the state and federal levels, since both health care 
providers and regulators need data in order to select the most serious 
problem areas for repair. 
(3) Disclosing Provider Performance.  Disclosure of adverse events can 
occur at three levels:  (a) induced disclosure of hospital adverse events 
and “near misses” to state regulators and quasi-regulators like the Joint 
Commission;17 (b) disclosure by the provider of adverse events to pa-
tients; and (c) publication of performance data about relative risks by 
private/public agents, designed for purchaser use. 
(4) Reforming Payment Systems.  These strategies include creating a 
range of financial incentives for providers to promote safety, through 
“pay for performance” initiatives, including bonuses and docking reim-
bursement for failures to meet minimum standards as well as using in-
surance exchanges to promote quality and safety improvements. 
(5) Coordinating and Integrating Care.  This strategy is the largest 
and most innovative category of federal health care reform, which 
promotes several new models for integrating health care delivery in 
the fragmented U.S. system. 
(6) Expanding Provider Responsibility.  This strategy includes imple-
menting legislative requirements for disclosure, expanded fiduciary 
 
lished manuscript presented at the Seventh International Conference in Organisation-
al Behaviour in Health Care, University of Birmingham, UK), available at http:// 
www.download.bham.ac.uk/hsmc/angus-corbett.pdf (discussing how implementing 
new and innovative oversight structures can improve patient safety and health). 
16 See generally Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety:  Toward a Federal Model of Med-
ical Error Reduction, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2005) (discussing the current regulatory struc-
ture of health care in the United States and proposing changes to strengthen federal 
regulation).  A look at the website of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ) reveals dozens of menus and links to every aspect of the health care quality ma-
trix.  AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov (last visited Mar. 
15, 2011). 
17 For more information on the Joint Commission, see infra Section II.A. 
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duties, and corporate-system responsibility for bad outcomes.18  There 
are also emerging examples of providers who market safety, such as 
Geisinger Health System’s guarantee that certain safety procedures 
will be undertaken during cardiac surgery.19 
Many of these initiatives represent real progress, but the culture of 
hospitals and the structure of payment have meant that these admira-
ble reform efforts have moved at a glacial pace.  As Troyen Brennan 
and Donald Berwick observed fifteen years ago, “Variation in practice 
runs rampant—beyond the bounds of common sense.  Hospitals and 
doctors continue to perpetrate harms in their work, albeit unintended 
ones.  And it is no easier now to cause an alcoholic surgeon to stop 
operating than it was forty years ago.”20  Little has changed since they 
stated their critique. 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).21  This Act is a major 
attempt to improve access to health care by expanding coverage 
through Medicaid and by reforming the private insurance market.  
Quality is also an important focus of PPACA—it promotes disease 
management, care coordination, new payment models, value-based 
purchasing initiatives, and the use of comparative effectiveness re-
search.  PPACA offers a strong regulatory push toward the goal of 
“flawless execution,” the health care equivalent of zero defects in in-
dustrial production.22 
 
18 See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW:  CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS chs. 1, 4 -6 (6th ed. 2008) for a discussion of the various regulatory initia-
tives.  I have considered several dimensions of the patient safety problem in a series of 
articles.  See Furrow, supra note 11; Barry R. Furrow, Medical Mistakes:  Tiptoeing Toward 
Safety, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 181 (2003); Barry R. Furrow, Patient Safety and the 
Fiduciary Hospital:  Sharpening Judicial Remedies, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 439 (2009); Furrow, 
supra note 16. 
19 See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee, Pay for Performance, Version 2.0?, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
531, 531-32 (2007) (outlining some of the critical processes Geisinger promises to un-
dertake to ensure patient safety). 
20 TROYEN A. BRENNAN & DONALD M. BERWICK, NEW RULES:  REGULATION, MAR-
KETS, AND THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 339 (1996). 
21 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
22 Robert Wachter uses the phrase “flawless execution” in relation to medical prac-
tice.  Robert M. Wachter, The End of the Beginning:  Patient Safety Five Years After ‘To Err Is 
Human,’ HEALTH AFF. W4-534, W4-535 (2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/ 
cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.534v1.  Wachter notes that as medicine has grown more com-
plicated and sophisticated, the need for coordination has grown.  Id.  “It should come 
as no surprise, then, that without a culture, procedures, and technology focused on 
flawless execution, errors would become commonplace.”  Id. 
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The passage of PPACA promises to take patient safety to the next 
level of regulatory intensity in American health care delivery, in part 
through the infusion of money into patient-safety research and into 
payment reforms in particular.  PPACA has an astonishing variety of 
provisions aimed at improving the quality of the U.S. health care sys-
tem, reducing errors, and generally promoting patient safety.23  These 
provisions include new centers, demonstration projects, and funding 
awards for a wide range of quality improvement initiatives.24  The Act 
sets out an ambitious research agenda for the United States and pro-
vides funding and other incentives to accomplish its goals.  It estab-
lishes a mandate of continuous, data-driven testing of the perfor-
mance of health care professionals and facilities.  It also launches 
“demonstration projects” through which the federal government 
funds particular forms of health care or health care delivery systems 
with a requirement that their performance be studied, often with the 
intent of examining their potential for wider adoption.25 
PPACA contains numerous provisions that fund research and dis-
seminate findings to providers about what works.  Some provisions de-
fine health care quality and its measures, while others attempt to gen-
erate new research findings on outcomes and best practices in the 
clinical setting.  Still other provisions mandate broad dissemination of 
these findings to providers and consumers of health care through 
websites and other media.  Finally, payment strategies will be ex-
panded and tested to determine how the Medicare payment system 
can better promote best practices and outcomes. 
 
23 See generally DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMM., THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORD-
ABLE CARE ACT AS PASSED (2010), available at http://dpc.senate.gov/healthreformbill/ 
healthbill53.pdf (providing the Democratic Party’s summary of PPACA’s contents). 
24 PPACA has five pilot projects and thirty demonstration projects.  Pilot initiatives 
include, for example: National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling, PPACA sec. 3023, 
§ 1866D, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4 (West Supp. 1B 2010); Healthy Aging, Living Well, id. 
§ 4202(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300u-14 (West Supp. 1A 2010); Demonstration Project Con-
cerning Individualized Wellness Plan, id. sec. 4206, § 330, 42 U.S.C.A. § 245b(s); and 
Pilot Testing Pay-for-Performance Programs for Certain Medicare Providers, id. 
§ 10326, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395b-1 note (West Supp. 1B 2010).  Demonstration projects 
include: Demonstration Project to Evaluate Integrated Care Around a Hospitalization, 
id. § 2704, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a note; Medicaid Global Payment System Demonstration 
Project, id. § 2705, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a note (West Supp. 1A 2010); Pediatric Account-
able Care Organization Demonstration Project, id. § 2706, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a note 
(West Supp. 1B 2010); Independence at Home Demonstration Program, id. sec. 3024, 
§ 1866D, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-5; and  Medicare Hospice Concurrent Care Demonstra-
tion Program, id. § 3140, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395d note. 
25 See sources cited supra notes 23-24. 
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I.  STANDARDIZING GOOD MEDICAL PRACTICES 
The culture of medicine is constructed around the challenges 
presented by individual patients and the need for individual provider 
judgment—as well as the perceived need, at times, for clinical he-
roism.  This culture values “expert audacity,” the insight of a brilliant 
clinician in solving a diagnostic puzzle.26  By contrast, improvement of 
health care generally requires system-wide improvements—reducing 
medical practice variation by figuring out what works, synthesizing 
these findings into clinical practice guidelines and best practices, and 
then applying them to ensure effective treatments.  Studies of Ameri-
can medicine have found large practice variation around the coun-
try,27 and it is clear that modern medicine still lacks validation for 
many treatment modalities.  Yet diffusion of good practice is a slow 
process often resisted by physicians.28 
Tools are already available to improve clinical performance.  One 
obvious example is a checklist.29  Atul Gawande writes about the tension 
between the model of expert audacity (the doctor as medical hero) and 
the model of regimentation, drawn from management of complex sys-
tems.30  He notes that in the intensive care unit (ICU) doctors treat very 
sick patients who require that hundreds of things be done right, every 
day, to keep them alive.31  Gawande argues that simple checklists have 
tremendous advantages in the complex world of the ICU.32  First, they 
help with memory recall.33  Second, they make clear and explicit “the 
 
26 See Atul Gawande, Annals of Medicine:  The Checklist, NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2007, at 
86, 94 (comparing the culture change in test pilots during the 1950s—from brazen and 
unregulated to refined and systemized—to what is currently transpiring in medicine). 
27 See, e.g., John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations:  A Proposal for 
Action, HEALTH AFF., May 1984, at 6, 9-15 (contending that norms of medical practice 
allow for a “wide range of professional discretion” and thus can result in significant dif-
ferences in how patients are treated); Understanding of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the 
Health Care System, DARTMOUTH ATLAS HEALTH CARE, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (using Medicare data to show “glaring variations in how medi-
cal resources are distributed and used in the United States”). 
28 The resistance of physicians to externally imposed standards and values is a recur-
rent theme in American health care.  For an excellent summary and analysis of the rea-
sons for this recalcitrance, see Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior:  Taking 
Doctors’ “Bad Law” Claims Seriously, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973, 973-75, 992-1008 (2009). 
29 See Gawande, supra note 26, at 91-92. 
30 Id. at 94. 
31 Id. at 89-90. 
32 Id. at 91. 
33 Id. 
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minimum, expected steps in complex processes.”34  Even experienced 
providers do not always understand the critical importance of some 
precautions, such as the use of antacid medication for ventilated pa-
tients.35  In Gawande’s words, “[c]hecklists establish[] a higher standard 
of baseline performance.”36  He continues: 
We have the means to make some of the most complex and dangerous 
work we do—in surgery, emergency care, and I.C.U. medicine—more ef-
fective than we ever thought possible.  But the prospect pushes against 
the traditional culture of medicine, with its central belief that in situations 
of high risk and complexity what you want is a kind of expert audacity—
the right stuff . . . . Checklists and standard operating procedures feel like 
exactly the opposite, and that’s what rankles many people.
37
 
Studies by Peter Pronovost and others also confirm the value of such 
relatively simple tools for constraining error in the hospital setting.38  
The infection-control checklist39 is now part of a project to cut line infec-
 
34 Id. at 91-92. 
35 Id. at 92. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 94. 
38 For a corroborating study of the benefit of basic procedures in reducing infec-
tions, see Peter Pronovost et al., An Intervention to Decrease Catheter-Related Bloodstream 
Infections in the ICU, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2725, 2729-31 (2006).  This study looked at 
one approach to reducing catheter-related bloodstream infections in sixty-seven hos-
pitals.  Id. at 2726, 2728.  The five procedures implemented in this approach were 
“hand washing, using full-barrier precautions during the insertion of central venous 
catheters, cleaning the skin with chlorhexidine, avoiding the femoral site if possible, 
and removing unnecessary catheters.”  Id. at 2726.  To increase use of these proce-
dures, a number of steps were taken: 
[C]linicians [were educated] about practices to control infection and harm 
resulting from catheter-related bloodstream infections, a central-line cart with 
necessary supplies was created, a checklist was used to ensure adherence to  
infection-control practices, providers were stopped (in nonemergency situa-
tions) if these practices were not being followed, the removal of catheters was 
discussed at daily rounds, and the teams received feedback regarding the 
number and rates of catheter-related bloodstream infection at monthly and 
quarterly meetings, respectively. 
Id. at 2726-27.  After three months of employing the procedures, the median rate of 
infection dropped from 2.7 infections per 1000 catheter days to zero infections; this 
zero infection rate was sustained during the subsequent fifteen months of follow-up.  
Id. at 2729-30. 
39 For a copy of the checklist, see AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUAL-
ITY, AHRQ PUB. NO. 09(10)-P013-2, FACT SHEET:  ENDING HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED 
INFECTIONS 4 (2009), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/haicusp.pdf. 
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tions by fifty percent by 2013.40  The Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ) has launched a project, “On the CUSP:  Stop BSI,” 
currently involving hundreds of hospitals across thirty-five states and the 
District of Columbia.41  The project aspires to emulate the success of 
hospitals in Michigan, where more than one hundred ICUs sliced their 
median rate of infection to zero per 1000 catheter days, which was signif-
icantly less than the national average of 1.8 to 5.2.42 
Practice guidelines are also needed in current medical practice.  
Current guidelines are often not grounded in good science but rather 
serve primarily as self-protective shields created by insurers and medi-
cal societies.43  Many of PPACA’s proposed reforms will have to con-
front this larger issue of physician resistance to change.  PPACA oper-
ates as a top-down model of regulation, but the general use of 
research dollars and financial payment incentives seeks to alter pro-
vider behavior from the bottom up.  PPACA, along with the stimulus 
bill entitled the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(Recovery Act),44 represents a major federal initiative to standardize 
medical practice—a systematic and well-funded national effort to im-
prove American medicine.  Together they pour millions of dollars in-
to government-funded research on effectiveness, best practices, and 
practice guidelines.45  This research is backed by new centers and in-
itiatives to disseminate findings and motivate providers to incorporate 
them into practice. 
 
40 National Targets and Metrics, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES tbl.1, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ash/initiatives/hai/nationaltargets/index.html (last visited Mar. 
15, 2011). 
41 Map of Hospitals Participating in the “On the CUSP:  Stop BSI” Project, ON THE CUSP:  
STOP HA1, http://www.onthecuspstophai.org/AbouStat-7954.html (last visited Mar. 
15, 2011). 
42 Pronovost et al., supra note 38, at 2726, 2728-30. 
43 See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields:  The Role of Clinical Practice 
Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 653 (2001) (noting 
the varying quality of such guidelines, which are often drafted to meet the goals of the 
drafting organization). 
44 Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. 
45 See, e.g., id. at 176-78 (allocating hundreds of millions of dollars to the AHRQ).  
Dissemination has been happening for more than a decade.  The ARHQ sponsors the 
National Guideline Clearinghouse, which reviews all guidelines for the quality of the evi-
dence supporting them.  NAT’L GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.guideline.gov 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (describing the website as a “public resource for evidence-
based clinical practice guidelines”). 
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A.  Quality Priorities and Measurement 
Several sections of PPACA discuss health care quality and its mea-
surement in extensive detail, as they relate to major funding programs 
that will focus research on outcomes, best practices, and comparative 
effectiveness.  Section 3011 of PPACA articulates a national strategy 
for improving “the delivery of health care services, patient health out-
comes, and population health.”46  The priorities identified include (1) 
“improving health outcomes, efficiency, and patient-centeredness of 
health care for all populations”; (2) “identifying areas . . . that have 
the potential for rapid improvement”; (3) “address[ing] gaps in quali-
ty, efficiency, comparative effectiveness information, and health out-
comes measures and data aggregation techniques”; (4) “improv[ing] 
Federal payment policy to emphasize quality and efficiency”; (5) “en-
hanc[ing] the use of health care data to improve quality, efficiency, 
transparency, and outcomes”; and (6) “improv[ing] research and dis-
semination of strategies and best practices to improve patient safety 
and reduce medical errors, preventable admissions and readmissions, 
and health care-associated infections.”47  Little is overlooked on this 
list of ideas for quality improvement. 
Section 3013 mandates the development of quality measures.48  A 
“quality measure” is defined as “a standard for measuring the perfor-
mance and improvement of population health or of health plans, pro-
viders of services, and other clinicians in the delivery of health care 
services.”49  Such quality measures will include, among others, “health 
outcomes and functional status of patients”; “the management and 
coordination of health care across episodes of care and care transi-
tions for patients across the continuum of providers, health care set-
tings, and health plans”; the quality of information provided to pa-
tients; “use of health information technology”; and the safety, 
effectiveness, patient-centeredness, appropriateness, timeliness, and 
efficiency of care.50 
 
46 PPACA sec. 3011, § 399HH(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 280j(a)(1) (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
47 Id., § 399HH(a)(2)(B)(i)–(v), (vii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 280j(a)(2)(B)(i)–(v), (vii). 
48 Id. sec. 3013(a)(4), § 931, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-31. 
49 Id., § 931(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-31(a). 
50 Id., § 931(c)(2)(A)–(F), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-31(c)(2)(A)–(F). 
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B.  Research on Outcomes and Outcome Measures 
Section 10303 of PPACA instructs the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) to develop provider-level outcome measures 
for hospitals, physicians, and other providers.51  Such measures will in-
clude at least ten outcome measurements for acute and chronic dis-
eases, including the five most prevalent and resource-intensive condi-
tions, within two years; for primary and preventative care, the Secretary 
will develop ten measurements for distinct populations within three 
years.52  This is a short timeline, and the focus on outcome measures 
represents a significant step toward a pay-for-performance system. 
Section 6301 mandates patient-centered outcomes research as a 
part of the larger goal of developing comparative clinical effectiveness 
research (CER).53  The section defines “comparative clinical effective-
ness research” to mean “research evaluating and comparing health 
outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of 2 or 
more medical treatments [and] services . . . .”54  PPACA further de-
fines medical treatments and services broadly, to include the provision 
of care as well as the use of medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and “in-
tegrative health practices.”55 
CER is well funded, with $1.1 billion provided by the Recovery Act 
divided among the AHRQ ($300 million), the National Institutes of 
Health ($400 million), and the Office of the HHS Secretary ($400 mil-
lion).56  PPACA created a new oversight entity, the Patient-Centered 
Outcomes Research (PCOR) Institute, to direct the CER program.57  
Section 6301 requires broad dissemination of research findings.58  
AHRQ’s Office of Communication and Knowledge Transfer will broad-
cast the research findings published by the PCOR Institute and other 
 
51 Id. sec. 10303(a), § 931(f)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-31(f)(1). 
52 Id., § 931(f)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-31(f)(2). 
53 Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e. 
54 Id., § 1181(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(a)(2)(A). 
55 Id., § 1181(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(a)(2)(B). 
56 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, tit. VIII, 
123 Stat. 115, 176-77 (2009); see also Comparative Effectiveness Research Funding, 
HHS.GOV/RECOVERY, http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/cer/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2011) (showing research funding allocation among government enti-
ties).  The Recovery Act created the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative 
Effectiveness Research to organize such research across the federal government.  Re-
covery Act § 804, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8. 
57 See infra Section I.C. 
58 PPACA sec. 6301(b), § 937, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-37. 
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agencies that are relevant to comparative CER.59  The office also must 
create “tools that organize and disseminate research findings for physi-
cians, health care providers, patients, payers, and policy makers.”60  It 
must “develop a publicly available resource database that collects and 
contains government-funded evidence and research from public, pri-
vate, not-for-profit, and academic sources.”61  By improving access to re-
search, the office should help clinicians incorporate the latest findings 
into their practice.62  Commentators expect that this focus on CER will 
have a profound effect on standardizing physician practice.63 
The PCOR Institute functions as a non-profit institute—not a gov-
ernment agency.64  The institute’s purpose is 
to assist patients, clinicians, purchasers, and policy-makers in making in-
formed health decisions by advancing the quality and relevance of evi-
dence concerning the manner in which diseases, disorders, and other 
health conditions can effectively and appropriately be prevented, diag-
nosed, treated, monitored, and managed through research and evidence 
synthesis that considers variations in patient subpopulations, and the dis-
semination of research findings with respect to the relative health out-
comes, clinical effectiveness, and appropriateness of the medical treat-
ments, services, and items described in subsection (a)(2)(B).
65
 
The institute will establish priorities for research in light of evi-
dence gaps in clinical outcomes, medical practice variation, and other 
quality issues articulated in the national strategy for quality care.66  
The institute must also release its research findings to clinicians, pa-
tients, and the public within ninety days of receiving them.67  These 
findings will be made available on the Institute’s website.68 
 
59 Id., § 937(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-37(a)(1). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id., § 937(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-37(b). 
63 See, e.g., Mohammad N. Akhter & Richard A. Levinson, Editorial, Comparative 
Effectiveness Research and the Future Practice of Medicine, 101 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 1301, 
1301 (2009) (“CER clearly has the potential to reshape major portions of the practice 
of medicine.”). 
64 PPACA sec. 6301(a), § 1181(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(b)(1). 
65 Id., § 1181(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(c). 
66 Id., § 1181(d)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(1)(A). 
67 Id., § 1181(d)(8)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(8)(A). 
68 Id., § 1181(h)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(h)(3). 
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C.  Evidence-Based Practices 
The Center for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety is created 
by section 3501 of PPACA to “identify, develop, evaluate, disseminate, 
and provide training in innovative methodologies and strategies for 
quality improvement practices in the delivery of health care services 
that represent best practices . . . in health care quality, safety, and val-
ue” in collaboration with other federal agencies.69 
This Center will support (1) the development of “best practices for 
quality improvement practices in the delivery of health care services”; 
(2) the redesign of systems to improve outcomes and patient safety, as 
well as to limit medical errors; (3) the identification of high-quality pro-
viders; (4) the assessment of research; and (5) the rapid dissemination 
of information into practice.70  It will also support, through contracts or 
other means, research on system improvements and the “development 
of tools to facilitate adoption of best practices that improve the quality, 
safety, and efficiency of health care delivery services.”71 
Such support includes the establishment of a Quality Improve-
ment Network Research Program for “testing, scaling, and disseminat-
ing . . . interventions to improve quality and efficiency in health 
care.”72  Findings will be released through multiple media, and shared 
with the Office of the National Coordinator of Health Information 
Technology.73  This data will help “inform the activities of the health 
information technology extension program under section 3012, as 
well as any relevant standards, certification criteria, or implementation 
specifications.”74 
Section 6301 also requires the HHS Secretary to  
provide for the coordination of relevant Federal health programs to 
build data capacity for comparative clinical effectiveness research, in-
cluding the development and use of clinical registries and health out-
comes research data networks, in order to develop and maintain a com-
prehensive, interoperable data network to collect, link, and analyze data 





69 Id. sec. 3501, § 933(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-33(a). 
70 Id., § 933(b)(2)–(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-33(b)(2)–(5). 
71 Id., § 933(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-33(c)(1). 
72 Id. 
73 Id., § 933(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-33(d). 
74 Id., § 933(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-33(d)(2). 
75 Id. sec. 6301(b), § 937(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-37(f). 
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Section 3501 provides for “quality improvement technical assis-
tance and implementation.”76  The Center for Quality Improvement 
and Patient Safety will award technical assistance and implementation 
grants to health care providers and delivery institutions so that they 
“understand, adapt, and implement the models and practices identi-
fied in the research conducted by the Center, including the Quality 
Improvement Networks Research Program.”77 
Section 10303(c), “Clinical Practice Guidelines,” requires the 
HHS Secretary to identify existing and new clinical practice guide-
lines.78  Government-generated practice guidelines and best practices 
are likely to be an improvement over the currently predominant med-
ical-specialty-created guidelines.  Consider the case of Trowbridge v. 
United States.79  The daughter of the plaintiffs suffered from cerebral 
palsy, allegedly due to the negligence of the doctor treating her 
mother during labor and delivery.80  The plaintiffs argued that the 
doctor did not exercise due care because he failed to monitor the pat-
tern of fetal contractions and continued to administer a drug that 
caused excessive contractions, which led to their daughter’s cerebral 
palsy.81  The case turned on expert testimony based on medical trea-
tises, journal articles, and standards for the interpretation of fetal 
heart rate strips produced by the American Congress of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists (ACOG).82  One witness, Dr. Richard Depp, was a 
long-time medical legal consultant who almost exclusively (ninety-five 
percent of the time) worked for defendants in medical malpractice 
cases.83  Dr. Depp also contributed to “consensus guidelines” crafted 
by the ACOG.”84 
Judge Bush, in evaluating Dr. Depp’s credibility as an expert wit-
ness, made a series of telling observations about how practice guide-
lines are created.  He observed that guidelines might be representa-
tive of pure “best practices,” but that conflicts are often apparent: 
The Court understands from the testimony at trial that these guidelines 
have a purpose of identifying common ground and uniform clinical prac-
 
76 Id. sec. 3501, § 934, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-34. 
77 Id., § 934(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-34(a)(1). 
78 Id. sec. 10303(c), § 304(b)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299 note. 
79 703 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Idaho 2010). 
80 Id. at 1130. 
81 Id. at 1131. 
82 Id. at 1132-37. 
83 Id. at 1136. 
84 Id. 
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tices across the country.  However, the Court was also left with a concern 
that the motivation of some who would press for such “consensus guide-
lines” is to revise terminology and set practice standards in a manner in-
tended to provide litigation safe-harbors for delivery physicians.
85
 
This sophisticated judicial analysis exposes the risks of self-interested 
medical society guideline development. 
Medicine is not a science, and medical practice is subject to tre-
mendous variation.  Physicians practice all too often in spite of          
evidence-based guidelines because they are ignorant of best practices 
or resist them for a range of reasons.86  However, it is clear from the 
medical error literature that best practices need to be disseminated 
and incorporated to a much greater extent.87  Since surgery-based and 
drug-related events are the majority of adverse events,88 regulatory ef-
forts must push evidence-based interventions to reduce these events. 
Will providers respond positively to these incentive-based devices to 
promote quality and standardization?  What kinds of strategies might 
we expect from providers to push back both against the standardization 
that will be more likely and the links of payment to performance?89  
PPACA offers some incentive strategies, but very few that will directly 
accelerate the incorporation of practice guidelines; there are no man-
dates, no liability shields to buy physician compliance, and no strong 
incentives.  To the contrary, Subtitle D of Title VI of PPACA, which pro-
vides for patient-centered outcomes research in sections 6301 and 6302, 
requires the Institute to ensure that research findings “not be construed 
as mandates for practice guidelines, coverage recommendations, pay-
ment, or policy recommendations.”90  Perhaps PPACA’s logic makes 
sense in this area—going slow in forcing standardization to avoid build-
ing provider resistance too early in the research process. 
 
85 Id. (footnote omitted). 
86 See Johnson, supra note 28, at 973-75, 992-1008. 
87 See generally INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 26-43. 
88 Id.; see also Reducing Errors in Health Care:  Translating Research into Practice, AGEN-
CY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/errors.htm (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2011) (disclosing categories of errors, including surgical errors). 
89 For a discussion of the sources of physician resistance to CER and guidelines 
generally, see Richard S. Saver, Health Care Reform’s Wild Card:  The Uncertain Effectiveness 
of Comparative Effectiveness Research, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2147 (2011).  For a critique of 
practice guidelines, see generally Harold C. Sox & Sheldon Greenfield, Quality of 
Care—How Good Is Good Enough?, 303 JAMA 2403 (2010). 
90 PPACA § 6301(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(8)(a)(iv) (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
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II.  TRACKING ADVERSE EVENTS IN HOSPITALS 
Reports from the IOM, beginning with To Err Is Human, focused 
attention on medical systems and the level of errors they produced.  
Hospitals and other providers were urged to develop error-tracking 
systems and strategies for improvement, including disclosure of both 
errors and so-called “near misses,” events that could have resulted in 
patient injury but were detected in time.91 
Reporting errors or adverse events is essential to system approach-
es.92  Underreporting in states with mandatory reporting is too often 
the norm,93 but a push for mandatory reporting models has begun to 
take root.  The Pennsylvania patient-safety statute, for example, re-
quires error disclosure,94 while the Joint Commission Sentinel Event 
Policy encourages but does not require disclosure of sentinel events.95  
Poor compliance with such disclosure requirements is inexcusable, 
particularly as to “near misses.”96 
 
91 See  INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 5-14 (summarizing the IOM’s recommenda-
tions). 
92 See Peter J. Pronovost et al., Improving the Value of Patient Safety Reporting Systems 
(discussing patient safety reporting systems and the need for data to identify and treat 
safety hazards), in 1 ADVANCES IN PATIENT SAFETY:  NEW DIRECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACHES 52, 52-53 (Kerm Henriksen et al. eds., 2008). 
93 There are several reasons for such poor performance.  Mandatory systems lack 
support from physicians, who are worried about liability, damage to reputation, and 
the hassle of any reporting system.  See JILL ROSENTHAL ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE 
HEALTH POLICY, CURRENT STATE PROGRAMS ADDRESSING MEDICAL ERRORS:  AN ANALY-
SIS OF MANDATORY REPORTING AND OTHER INITIATIVES 80-81 (2001) (discussing state-
mandated adverse event reporting and barriers to such reporting even when man-
dated); Bryan A. Liang, Dr. Arthur Grayson Distinguished Lecture in Law & Medicine, 
Promoting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error:  A Paradigm of Cooperation Between 
Patient, Physician, and Attorney, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 541, 555 (2000) (noting that because 
“patient safety medical error information” can be used in litigation, there is a “tre-
mendous negative incentive” to report such errors). 
94 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.308(a) (West Supp. 2010) (“A health care 
worker who reasonably believes that a serious event or incident has occurred shall re-
port the serious event or incident . . . .”). 
95  THE JOINT COMM’N, SENTINEL EVENTS (SE), at SE-8 (2011), available at http:// 
www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/2011_CAMH_SE.pdf.  The Joint Commission 
stresses the advantages to hospitals that self-report, including early consultation with 
the Joint Commission during the hospital’s development of its root-cause analysis and 
action plan.  Id. at SE-8 to -9. 
96 See John R. Clark, Leadership Series:  Is Your Institution Leaving Patient Safety Infor-
mation at the Bedside?, 5 PA. PATIENT SAFETY ADVISORY 109, 109 (2008), available at 
http://www.patientsafetyauthority.org/ADVISORIES/AdvisoryLibrary/2008/Dec5(4)/
documents/109.pdf (“Hospitals that are not capturing near-miss . . . events are hurting 
their ability to identify and correct problems before they harm patients.”). 
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A.  Sentinel Events and the Joint Commission 
The Joint Commission is a private accreditor, granted authority by 
federal and state governments to accredit hospitals.97  Through its Senti-
nel Event Policy, the Joint Commission urges reporting of sentinel 
events by hospitals on two levels:  first to the Joint Commission, and 
second to patients.  A “sentinel event” is defined as “an unexpected oc-
currence involving death or severe physical or psychological injury, or 
the risk thereof,”98 including (1) unanticipated death or major loss of 
functioning unrelated to the patient’s condition; (2) patient suicide; 
(3) wrong-side surgery; (4) infant abduction/discharge to the wrong 
family; (5) rape; and (6) hemolytic transfusion reactions.99  If hospitals 
elect not to report sentinel events to the Joint Commission, and the 
Commission learns of the events from a third party, the hospital must 
conduct an analysis of the root cause and report its findings and plan of 
action to the Commission or risk loss of accreditation.100  It is likely, how-
ever, that many so-called “sentinel events” are not reported,101 and the 
Joint Commission rarely takes away the accreditation of a hospital.102 
 
97 See About the Joint Commission, JOINT COMMISSION, http://www.jointcommission. 
org/about_us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) 
(describing the Joint Commission as a nonprofit organization accrediting and certify-
ing U.S. health care organizations and programs). 
98 THE JOINT COMM’N, supra note 95, at SE-1. 
99 Id. at SE-5 to -7. 
100 Id. at SE-9.  While reporting of sentinel events is not mandatory, the Joint Com-
mission bases its accreditation decisions in part on how hospitals respond to such events.   
Accredited hospitals are expected to identify and respond appropriately to all 
sentinel events . . . occurring in the hospital or associated with services that 
the hospital provides . . . . Appropriate response includes conducting a timely, 
thorough, and credible root cause analysis; developing an action plan de-
signed to implement improvements to reduce risk; implementing the im-
provements; and monitoring the effectiveness of those improvements. 
Id. at SE-2.   
101 In fact, the Joint Commission itself acknowledges this reality by including a dis-
claimer in its review of sentinel event data:  “The reporting of most sentinel events to 
the Joint Commission is voluntary and represents only a small proportion of actual 
events.  Therefore, these data are not an epidemiologic data set and no conclusions 
should be drawn about the actual relative frequency of events or trends in events over 
time.”  THE JOINT COMM’N, SENTINEL EVENT DATA:  EVENT TYPE BY YEAR:  1995–FOURTH 
QUARTER 2010, at 4 (2011), available at http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/ 
Event_Type_by_Year_1995_4Q2010(v2).pdf. 
102 See Lisa Girion & Rong-Gong Lin II, Healthcare:  Drastic Setback for OC Hospital, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2008, at 1, available at 2008 WLNR 23460341 (noting that the Joint 
Commission revocation of accreditation is a “rare occurrence”). 
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B.  “Never Events” 
The concept of “never events” was first developed by the National 
Quality Forum (NQF)103 to describe gross medical errors, “errors in 
medical care that are clearly identifiable, preventable, and serious in 
their consequences for patients, and that indicate a real problem in 
the safety and credibility of a health care facility.”104  Examples of nev-
er events include:  “surgery on the wrong body part; foreign body left 
in a patient after surgery; mismatched blood transfusion; major medi-
cation error; severe ‘pressure ulcer’ acquired in the hospital; and pre-
ventable post-operative deaths.”105  More than twenty states have now 
adopted a reporting requirement for “never events,” forcing providers 
to disclose adverse outcomes to the appropriate state department, 
with the goal of improving their operations.106  Such disclosure allows 
states to systematically record and track errors, in order to analyze pat-
terns of adverse events, give feedback to hospitals, and in some states, 
provide information for consumers about the relative performance of 
hospitals and other providers.  Many states have enacted legislation 
requiring reporting of incidents on the NQF list.107  In 2003, Minneso-
ta was the first state to mandate reporting of “never events.”108  Other 
states, including New Jersey, Connecticut, and Illinois, have also 
adopted such reporting requirements.”109 
 
103 See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Eliminating Serious, 
Preventable, and Costly Medical Errors—Never Events (May 18, 2006), available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1863 (attributing the 
definition of “never events” to the NQF). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 See Patient Safety Primers: Never Events, AHRQ PATIENT SAFETY NETWORK, 
http://psnet.ahrq.gov/primer.aspx?primerID=3 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (“Since 
the NQF disseminated its original Never Events list in 2002, 11 states have mandated 
reporting of these incidents whenever they occur, and an additional 16 states mandate 
reporting of serious adverse events (including many of the NQF Never Events).”).  
Some states, like Minnesota, require a root-cause analysis after such events are re-
ported.  Id. 
107 See Press Release, Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 103 (de-
scribing a few states’ reporting requirements to the NQF). 
108 Id.; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.7065 (West Supp. 2009) (requiring the re-
porting of certain adverse health care events to the state). 
109 See Press Release, Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 103 (sum-
marizing the reporting requirements of these states). 
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C.  Patient Safety Organizations 
In 2005, Congress passed the Patient Safety and Quality Improve-
ment Act (Patient Safety Act)110 to encourage the expansion of volun-
tary, provider-driven initiatives to improve the quality and safety of 
health care.111  The Patient Safety Act promotes cooperation between 
health care providers and patient-safety research entities to improve 
patient safety.112  It creates various legal protections and frameworks to 
encourage the voluntary collection and reporting of safety informa-
tion by providers.113  The goal is to minimize patient care errors in the 
U.S. health system through improved data analysis.114 
Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs) serve as the primary entities 
“responsible for aggregating and analyzing provider error data.”115  
They work with clinicians and health care organizations to identify, ana-
lyze, and reduce the “risks and hazards associated with patient care.”116  
Entities eligible to become PSOs may be public or private, for-profit or 
not-for-profit, or even health care providers, such as hospital chains.117  
PSOs will be responsible for compiling and analyzing error information 
provided by health care providers.118  With this information, PSOs will 
be able to make recommendations to providers on how to avoid errors 
in health care practice.119  Further, on a national level, PSOs will provide 
their collected data to the Network of Patient Safety Databases 
(NPSD).120  These networks, also created by the Patient Safety Act, will 
work to analyze error trends on both a national and regional level, re-
 
110 Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26 
(2006)); see also Patient Safety Rule, 42 C.F.R. § 3 (2010) (implementing the Patient 
Safety Act). 
111 See Welcome to AHRQ’s Patient Safety Organization Web Site, AGENCY FOR HEALTH-
CARE RES. & QUALITY, http://www.pso.ahrq.gov (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (introduc-
ing the role played by Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs) within the Patient Safety 
Act and providing information about them). 
112 See Frederick Levy et al., The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005:  
Preventing Error and Promoting Patient Safety, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 397, 407 (2010) (describ-




116  Patient Safety Organization Information, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALI-
TY, http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/psos/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
117 Id. 
118 Levy et al., supra note 112, at 408 (describing how the Patient Safety Act works). 
119 Id. 
120 42 U.S.C. § 299b-23(a) (2006). 
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commending strategies for the health care system as a whole.121  This is 
not a regulatory strategy aimed directly at providers but rather an ac-
cumulation of public health data to be used later by policymakers. 
III.  DISCLOSING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE 
Reporting of hospitals’ comparative outcomes could be valuable 
to patients as they try to choose the best place for their operations, al-
though studies suggest consumer use of such reporting is minimal.122  
Certainly, private and government payers can evaluate provider quali-
ty more effectively as the data improve over time.123  Comparative data 
need to be carefully extracted and presented; while it may not be easy 
to evaluate and compare institutions,124 the technologies of data com-
parison can only improve under external pressure to disclose such da-
ta.  The marketplace has been willing to offer such comparisons as 
specialty groups reach agreement about what are relevant data.  In 
one dramatic example, Consumer Reports partnered with the Society of 
Thoracic Surgeons to rank over two hundred heart-bypass groups on a 
scale of one star (the worst) to three stars (the best) based on their 
performance against their peers.125 
The first regulatory step toward this larger goal of comparing out-
comes has been the disclosure of adverse events to injured patients. 
 
121 Id. § 299b-23(c); see also Levy et al., supra note 112, at 408. 
122 See, e.g., Martin N. Marshall et al., The Public Release of Performance Data:  What Do 
We Expect to Gain?  A Review of the Evidence, 283 JAMA 1866, 1867 (2000) (reviewing stu-
dies that analyzed the impact of publicly releasing health care performance data and 
finding that consumer use was minimal at best); Eric C. Schneider & Arnold M. Eps-
tein, Use of Public Performance Reports:  A Survey of Patients Undergoing Cardiac Surgery, 279 
JAMA 1638 (1998) (assessing patient use of a publicly available report card listing hos-
pital mortality rates for cardiac surgery and finding that patients rarely used such in-
formation when choosing between health care providers). 
123 See M.N. Marshall & P.S. Romano, Impact of Reporting Hospital Performance, 14 
QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 77, 77 (2005) (noting the lack of evidence that public 
disclosure improves the quality of care, even though provider organizations are sensi-
tive to the publication of such data). 
124 See Ashish K. Jha et al., Care in U.S. Hospitals—The Hospital Quality Alliance Pro-
gram, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 265, 271-72, 274 (2005) (noting the “hard work that lies 
ahead” in expanding and refining health care comparative data analyses). 
125 Heart-Bypass Surgery:  50 Top-Rated Surgical Groups, CONSUMER REP., Oct. 2010, at 
40, 40.  Only subscribers of ConsumerReportsHealth.org have access to the full rank-
ings and the detailed statistical information used to rank the surgical groups, but the 
top fifty groups are listed in the October 2010 edition of Consumer Reports.  Id.  For 
more background and a critical assessment of the rankings, see Timothy G. Ferris & 
David F. Torchiana, Public Release of Clinical Outcomes Data—Online CABG Report Cards, 
363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1593 (2010). 
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A.  Disclosing Adverse Events to Patients:  The Veterans 
Administration and Joint Commission Models 
Adverse-event reporting is often coupled with disclosure of classes 
of bad outcomes to patients and their families.  This disclosure idea 
developed as the result of a program begun by a VA hospital, and has 
been adopted by the VA system.  The VA disclosure model served as 
the foundation for Pennsylvania’s legislation that created the Patient 
Safety Authority.126  As of 2005, the VA requires disclosure of “adverse 
events to patients and their representatives, including adverse events 
that have had or are expected to have a clinical effect on the patient” 
or “necessitate a change in the patient’s care.”127 
The Joint Commission, the accrediting body for most U.S. hospit-
als, has imposed a disclosure standard requiring that “[p]atients and, 
when appropriate, their families [be] informed about the outcomes of 
care, including unanticipated outcomes.”128  Pennsylvania created a 
Patient Safety Authority which mandates that hospitals report all “se-
rious event[s].”129  Fines may be levied for failures to report,130 and the 
statute provides for whistleblower protections.131  Pennsylvania also 
adopted a patient notification requirement.132 
If administered well, the patient-notification requirements of the 
Joint Commission, the VA, and the Pennsylvania statute have the po-
tential not only to reduce medical errors but also the frequency of 
 
126 Conversation with Stanton Smullens, Member, Pa. Patient Safety Auth., in 
Wilmington, DE (Mar. 10, 2004). 
127 VHA Directive 2005-049, Disclosure of Adverse Events to Patients (V.A. 2005), 
available at http://www.sorrywork.net/pdf/VA_Link.pdf.  The VA issued a revised di-
rective in 2008.  See VHA Directive 2008-002, Disclosure of Adverse Events to Patients 
(V.A. 2008), available at http://www.va.gov/vhapublications/ViewPublication.asp?pub_ 
ID=1637. 
128 STANDARDS IN SUPPORT OF PATIENT SAFETY AND MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE ERROR 
REDUCTION RI.1.2.2 (The Joint Comm’n 2001); see also JOINT COMM’N RES., THE JOINT 
COMM’N, PATIENT SAFETY:  ESSENTIALS FOR HEALTH CARE 88 (5th ed. 2009) (“[A] li-
censed independent practitioner or another caregiver responsible for a patient’s care 
should explain all outcomes of care, including any unexpected outcomes of that care, 
to that patient/family.  This standard specifically includes unanticipated outcomes that 
relate to sentinel events that are considered reviewable by the Joint Commission.”).   
129 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.308(a) (West Supp. 2010).  For a discussion of 
the origins of the Authority, see Stanton N. Smullens et al., Pennsylvania’s Approach to 
Reducing Medical Error:  The Story of the Patient Safety Authority, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 39, 
45-52 (2005). 
130 Id. § 1303.313(f). 
131 Id. § 1303.308(c). 
132 Id. § 1303.308(b).  
FURROW – FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2011  4:15 PM 
2011] Regulating Patient Safety 1749 
malpractice litigation.  We see again a developing regulatory duty, 
both state and federal, to force hospitals to gather data and share it 
with the public. 
B.  PPACA and Disclosure 
The public reporting of performance information is a central fea-
ture of the patient-safety provisions of PPACA.  The Act establishes a 
wide range of demonstration projects and awards to fund research on 
outcomes and effectiveness.133  Once those data become available, 
PPACA mandates their wide dissemination to other government 
agencies, providers, and the public generally.134  Comparative informa-
tion moves beyond disclosure of adverse events to patients or future 
patients to a much broader set of comparative factors to aid in select-
ing a health care provider.  For example, the Physician Compare web-
site will include not only patient outcomes and functional status, but 
also efficiency, patient and family experiences, effectiveness, and time-
liness of care.135 
PPACA creates several new entities to disseminate findings.  The 
Center for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety is required by sec-
tion 3501 to make its findings available to the public “through multiple 
media and appropriate formats to reflect the varying needs of health 
care providers and consumers and diverse levels of health literacy.”136  
Its research findings are to be shared with the Office of the National 
Coordinator of Health Information Technology and “used to inform 
the activities of the health information technology extension program 
under section 3012, as well as any relevant standards, certification cri-
teria, or implementation specifications.”137  Section 3015 mandates the 
collection of “data on quality and resource use measures” in order to 
“implement the public reporting of performance information”; grants 
can be given to fund this data collection.138 
Section 3015 further provides for performance websites, which are 
to “make available to the public . . . performance information summa-
rizing data on quality measures.  Such information will be tailored to 
respond to the differing needs of hospitals and other institutional 
 
133 See supra Section I.B. 
134 PPACA sec. 6301(b), § 937(a), 42 U.S.C.A. 299b-37(a) (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
135 Id. § 10331(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-5(a)(2) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
136 Id. sec. 3501, § 933(d)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-33(d)(1) (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
137 Id., § 933(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-33(d)(2). 
138 Id. sec. 3015, § 399II(a), 42  U.S.C.A. § 280j-1(a). 
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health care providers, physicians and other clinicians, patients, con-
sumers, researchers, policymakers, States, and other stakeholders, as 
the Secretary may specify.”139  This performance information “shall in-
clude information regarding clinical conditions to the extent such in-
formation is available, and the information shall, where appropriate, 
be provider-specific and sufficiently disaggregated and specific to 
meet the needs of patients with different clinical conditions.”140 
The assumption behind such public posting of outcome and per-
formance information on websites is that consumers will access the 
site and use it to make choices among providers. 
1.  Physician Compare 
Comparison websites existed prior to PPACA, most notably Hospital 
Compare141 and Nursing Home Compare.142  PPACA institutes several 
new sites to complement these.  Section 10331 provides that physician-
performance information will be made available online to consumers 
through a Physician Compare Internet website.143  Via this website, the 
public will be able to compare physicians along various performance 
indicia, including “measures collected under the Physician Quality 
Reporting Initiative”; “patient health outcomes and the functional sta-
tus of patients”; “continuity and coordination of care and care transi-
tions, including episodes of care and risk-adjusted resource use”; “effi-
ciency”; “patient experience and patient, caregiver, and family 
engagement”; and “safety, effectiveness, and timeliness of care.”144 
Physicians will be able to review their results before they are pub-
licly reported,145 and the HHS Secretary must ensure the statistical va-
lidity and reliability of the data, including that “risk adjustment me-
 
139 Id., § 399JJ(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 280j-2(a). 
140 Id., § 399JJ(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 280j-2(b). 
141 See Hospital Compare, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http:// 
www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (enabling users to compare hos-
pitals along various criteria).  For a fuller description, see Hospital Compare, CENTERS FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/11_ 
HospitalCompare.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
142 See Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/ 
NHCompare (last visited Mar. 15, 2001) (providing “detailed information about every 
Medicare and Medicaid-certified nursing home” in the United States). 
143 PPACA § 10331(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-5(a) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
144 Id. § 10331(a)(2)(A)–(G), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-5(a)(2)(A)–(G). 
145 Id. § 10331(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-5(b)(2). 
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chanisms” be used;146 that it “provide a robust and accurate portrayal 
of a physician’s performance”; that there be “appropriate attribution 
of care when multiple physicians and other providers are involved”; 
that “timely statistical performance feedback” be provided; and that 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services have computer and da-
ta systems capable of “supporting valid, reliable, and accurate public 
reporting activities.”147 
2.  Infection Compare 
PPACA also mandates the reporting of outcome measures for 
hospital-acquired infections.  Section 10303(b) mandates that “the 
Secretary . . . publicly report on measures for hospital-acquired condi-
tions that are currently utilized by [CMS] for the adjustment of the 
amount of payment to hospitals based on rates of hospital-acquired 
infections.”148  Since hospital infections are a major source of patient 
injury and death, the outcome reports for the purposes of payment 
are also likely to set a baseline beyond which infections may be consi-
dered unacceptable for liability purposes.  Infection-control report 
cards are an example of how infection compare can be used.149 
Consumer-oriented performance websites raise interesting issues 
about likely effects on consumer choices of providers.  Studies of con-
sumer behavior have found, for example, that consumers have rarely 
used the comparative assessments that were available, and that quality 
may even be reduced.150  On the other hand, providing patients with 
quality information about what to expect from providers might en-
courage those providers to vouch for their work.  Publication of per-
formance information can also stimulate quality improvement.151  As 
 
146 Id. § 10331(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-5(b)(1). 
147 Id. § 10331(b)(3)–(7), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-5(b)(3)–(7). 
148 Id. sec. 10303(b), § 1890A(f), 42. U.S.C.A. § 1395aaa-1(f). 
149 See Robert A. Weinstein et al., Infection-Control Report Cards—Securing Patient Safe-
ty, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 225, 227 (2005) (arguing for the use of report cards that 
would allow patients to compare infection rates among hospitals). 
150 See, e.g., Rachel M. Werner & David A. Asch, The Unintended Consequences of Pub-
licly Reporting Quality Information, 293 JAMA 1239, 1240 (2005) (noting that consumers 
often do not utilize quality information when making health care decisions); see also 
Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers:  Courts, Contracts, and the New 
Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 688-89 (2008) (discussing consumers’ prob-
lems in the medical market, including selecting doctors). 
151 See, e.g., Judith H. Hibbard et al., Does Publicizing Hospital Performance Stimulate 
Quality Improvement Efforts?, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 84, 92-94 (discussing a study 
indicating that public disclosure of performance encourages quality improvement); Dana 
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regulators increase the pressure for disclosure of such data, and data 
improve, hospital performance is likely to improve.  I would even ar-
gue that both physicians and hospitals should have a duty to inform 
patients of “hospital outcome disparities”—as a logical extension of 
the informed consent doctrine.152   
IV.  REFORMING PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
Insurance generally covers treatment costs induced by errors and 
adverse events; if insurance does not cover them, these costs must be 
absorbed by patients, families, employers, and state and private disa-
bility and income-support programs.  As a result, “[A]dverse outcomes 
are externalized to other payers and not internalized by providers best 
able to reduce these hazards or prevent them.”153  Lucian Leape and 
Donald Berwick point out that “[i]n most industries, defects cost 
money and generate warranty claims.  In health care, perversely, un-
der most forms of payment, health care professionals receive a pre-
mium for a defective product; physicians and hospitals can bill for the 
additional services that are needed when patients are injured by their 
mistakes.”154  Given this cost-shifting feature of health insurance, tort 
suits have been the primary, if not only, mechanism for making hos-
pitals and providers internalize these excess costs.155 
 
B. Mukamel et al., Quality Report Cards, Selection of Cardiac Surgeons, and Racial Disparities:  
A Study of the Publication of the New York State Cardiac Surgery Reports, 41 INQUIRY 435, 443-44 
(2004) (“[P]ublished quality rankings have both a direct effect and indirect effect, substi-
tuting at least partially for implicit signals for quality.”).  But see Zoltan G. Turi, The Big 
Chill:  The Deleterious Effects of Public Reporting on Access to Health Care for the Sickest Patients, 
45 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1766, 1766-67 (2005) (raising skepticism about the claimed 
benefit of publicly reporting physician performance data and arguing that such report-
ing might even diminish health outcomes for the highest-risk patients). 
152 For a debate on this issue, see Nadine Housri et al., Should Informed Consent for 
Cancer Treatment Include a Discussion About Hospital Outcome Disparities?, 5 PUB. LIBR. SCI. 
MED. 1413 (2008), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi% 
2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0050214.  In this debate, Robert Weil acknowledges the 
difficulty of gathering reliable data but argues for a “principle of transparency,” which 
demands that the data be disclosed to patients.  Id. at 1415-16. 
153 Furrow, Patient Safety and the Fiduciary Hospital, supra note 18, at 482. 
154 Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After To Err Is Human:  What 
Have We Learned?, 293 JAMA 2384, 2388 (2005) (citation omitted). 
155  See E. HAAVI MORREIM, HOLDING HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTABLE:  LAW AND THE 
NEW MEDICAL MARKETPLACE 3-12 (2001) (describing the relationship between tort 
suits and behavior change and explaining what needs to be altered to make health 
care providers more accountable). 
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This reliance on tort suits is changing.  CMS has several outcome-
based payment programs in place,156 and PPACA supports this trend to 
dock providers who fall below quality standards and to award bonuses 
to those who exceed them.  Such pay-for-performance concepts are 
already well underway in Medicare reimbursement, and it is not the 
most revolutionary feature of PPACA, as Part V will demonstrate. 
A.  “Never Events” 
The original concept of “never events”157 was to mandate that hos-
pitals notify state officials of such events so that these bad outcomes 
could be tracked statewide.  Indirectly, they serve as a source of mod-
est regulatory pressure on hospitals to reduce the frequency of such 
events and avoid the public embarrassment that revelation of their 
performance might create.  CMS has since adopted a nonpayment 
strategy that is based on the “never events” approach, recognizing the 
added costs to the Medicare program in treating the consequences of 
such events.158  This CMS position on “never events” and payment 
represents a significant step toward pay for performance. 
B.  Hospital-Acquired Infections 
Medicare began to adjust payments in 2008 for hospital-acquired 
infections.159  If the diagnosis is not present on admission to the hos-
pital, then payment for several hospital-acquired infections will be dis-
allowed.160  This payment initiative continually enlarges the list of dis-
allowed conditions and represents real pressure on hospitals to reduce 
their level of infections to avoid reimbursement losses.  
 
156 See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN TO 
TRANSITION TO A MEDICARE VALUE-BASED PURCHASING PROGRAM FOR PHYSICIAN AND 
OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 9-24 (Dec. 9, 2008), available at http://www.cms.gov/ 
PhysicianFeeSched/downloads/PhysicianVBP-Plan-Issues-Paper.pdf (discussing per-
formance-based program designs for Medicare).  
157 For a definition of “never events,” see text accompanying supra note 104. 
158 Fiscal Year 2009 Quality Measure Reporting for 2010 Payment Update, CENTERS FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/downloads/ 
HospitalRHQDAPU200808.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
159 Id. 
160 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid—CMS, PREMIER, http://www.premierinc.com/ 
quality-safety/tools-services/safety/topics/guidelines/cms-guidelines-4-infection.jsp 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
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C.  Premier Hospital Quality Initiative 
As early as 2002, CMS had launched a national Premier Quality 
Initiative in which hospitals are ranked in deciles by performance.161  
Those hospitals ranked within the top ten and twenty percent will re-
ceive a two-percent and a one-percent bonus payment, respectively.162  
If hospital performance falls below the payment adjustment threshold 
by year three, the hospital will receive reduced Medicare reimburse-
ment—losing as much as one or two percent of its previous Medicare 
payment.163  This is a small but effective pay-for-performance initiative 
that PPACA continues more aggressively. 
D.  Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment  
Update Program 
CMS gives hospitals that successfully report designated quality 
measures a higher annual increase in their payment rates, while hos-
pitals that do not participate or meet reporting requirements will have 
a two-percent reduction in their Medicare annual payment update.  
This information is available to consumers on the Hospital Compare 
website, continuing the movement to disclose performance to con-
sumers while also linking reimbursement to performance.164   
E.  Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS) 
The PQRS165 is a voluntary reporting program that offers extra in-
centive payments to medical practices whose providers report data on 
 
161 See Rewarding Superior Quality Care:  The Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstra-
tion Fact Sheet, ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM (2006), http://www.allhealth.org/ 
BriefingMaterials/HospitalPremierFS200602-175.pdf (explaining how hospitals will be 
scored and ranked based on quality measures); see also Premier Hospital Quality Incentive 
Demonstration, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/ 
HospitalQualityInits/35_HospitalPremier.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (describing the 
initiative and linking to results of the project). 
162 Rewarding Superior Quality Care, supra note 161. 
163 Id. 
164 Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Updates the National 
Hospital Quality Measure Acute Myocardial Infarction Set for Discharges as of April 1, 
2009 (Dec. 31, 2008), available at www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/Downloads/ 
HospitalAMI-6FactSheet.pdf. 
165 The Medicare Improvements and Extension Act of 2006, sec. 101(b), § 1848, 
120 Stat. 2975, 2975-77, established PQRS.  The PQRS was originally called the PQRI 
(Physician Quality Reporting Initiative).  Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., Physician Quality Reporting System and E-Prescribing Program (Nov. 3, 2010), 
available at http://www.cms.gov/apps/media/press/factsheet.asp?Counter=3858. 
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quality measures for covered Physician Fee Schedule services under 
Medicare Part B.166  For 2011, an incentive payment of one percent of 
total Medicare Part B allowed charges for a provider is possible.167  
CMS has expanded PQRS for 2011 and beyond, adding twenty new 
measures, including several involving reporting through electronic 
health records.168  In addition to offering bonuses, the system will dock 
providers who do not satisfactorily report data on quality measures by 
one-and-a-half percent starting in 2015 and two percent in 2016 and 
after.169  Providers who write prescriptions electronically starting in 
2011 can earn an incentive payment of one percent of their total al-
lowed Medicare Part B services during the reporting period.170  Also, 
as of 2012, providers who are not “successful” e-prescribers will suffer 
a “program adjustment[]”; in other words, their reimbursement will 
be docked.171 
F.  General Quality Indicators 
CMS has issued a proposed rule172 that “would establish a new 
hospital value-based purchasing program to reward hospitals for pro-
viding high quality, safe care for patients.”173  Hospitals that performed 
well under the program in both quality of care delivered to patients 
and patient experience of care would receive higher payments.174 
G.  Insurance Exchange Mandates 
Quality-reimbursement incentives pervade PPACA.  The Act fo-
cuses primarily on Medicare payment incentives, given the magnitude 
of such payments in the U.S. health care system.  But PPACA’s central 
focus is reform of the private insurance market.  Health Benefit Ex-
changes are a central feature of this insurance market reform.  Such 
 






172 Hospital Inpatient Value-Based Purchasing Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 2454 (pro-
posed Jan. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 422 and 480). 
173 Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Affordable Care Act to Im-
prove Hospital Care for Patients ( Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.cms.gov/apps/ 
media/press/release.asp?Counter=3893. 
174 Id. 
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exchanges will promote transparency for consumers; they will also use 
reimbursement incentives to evaluate private insurers who seek to sell 
insurance through the exchanges, and to force them to evaluate hos-
pitals by the same benchmarks. 
Part II, Subtitle D of PPACA, “Consumer Choices and Insurance 
Competition Through Health Benefit Exchanges,” has an important 
quality component.  Section 1311 spells out the form of the American 
Health Benefit Exchanges.175  Subsection (c) specifies criteria for the 
certification of health plans, including marketing and provider choice 
provisions.176  Subsection (c)(1)(D) addresses quality issues, requiring 
that accreditation of plans be based in part on 
local performance on clinical quality measures such as the Healthcare 
Effectiveness Data and Information Set, patient experience ratings on a 
standardized Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems 
survey, as well as consumer access, utilization management, quality as-
surance, provider credentialing, complaints and appeals, network ade-
quacy and access, and patient information programs . . . .
177
 
Subsection (c)(1)(E) requires the plans to “implement a quality 
improvement strategy,”178 and subsection (c)(1)(H) requires disclo-
sure of quality measures to enrollees and prospective enrollees.179 
PPACA’s section 1001 amends portions of the Public Health Ser-
vice Act, including section 2717, “Ensuring the Quality of Care,” which 
requires that the HHS Secretary “develop reporting requirements for 
use by a group health plan, and a health insurance issuer offering 
group or individual health insurance coverage, with respect to plan or 
coverage benefits and health care provider reimbursement struc-
tures . . . .”180  These reporting requirements require the insurer to: 
(A) improve health outcomes through the implementation of activities 
such as quality reporting, effective case management, care coordination, 
chronic disease management, and medication and care compliance in-
itiatives, . . . for treatment or services under the plan or coverage; 
(B) implement activities to prevent hospital readmissions through a 
comprehensive program for hospital discharge that includes patient-
centered education and counseling, comprehensive discharge planning, 
 
175 PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
176 Id. § 1311(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c). 
177 Id. § 1311(c)(1)(D), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(1)(D). 
178 Id. § 1311(c)(1)(E), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(1)(E). 
179 Id. § 1311(c)(1)(H), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(1)(H). 
180 Id. sec. 1001, § 2717(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-17(a)(1) (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
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and post discharge reinforcement by an appropriate health care profes-
sional; 
(C) implement activities to improve patient safety and reduce medical 
errors through the appropriate use of best clinical practices, evidence 
based medicine, and health information technology under the plan or 
coverage; and 
(D) implement wellness and health promotion activities.
181
 
Finally, subsection 1311(g) of PPACA, “Rewarding Quality Through 
Market-Based Incentives,” mandates a payment structure that is quality 
and health outcome based, providing increased reimbursement or 
other incentives for improvements in health outcomes through quality 
reporting and a range of other coordination initiatives found else-
where in PPACA.182  Its most relevant patient safety language can be 
found in subsection (1)(C), which mandates quality payments for “the 
implementation of activities to improve patient safety and reduce 
medical errors through the appropriate use of best clinical practices, 
evidence based medicine, and health information technology under 
the plan or coverage.”183 
The second significant patient-safety component of the health ex-
changes is the relationship of qualified health plans to hospitals.  Sub-
section 1311(h), “Quality Improvement,” specifies that a qualified 
health plan may contract with a hospital with more than fifty beds only 
if the hospital “utilizes a patient safety evaluation system” and has a 
mechanism in place “to ensure that each patient receives a compre-
hensive program for hospital discharge that includes patient-centered 
education and counseling, comprehensive discharge planning, and 
post discharge reinforcement by an appropriate health care profes-
sional.”184  This provision links the health plans and hospitals through 
compliance with patient-safety systems of various kinds and uses both 
plan certification and reimbursement to drive patient-safety mechan-
isms in providers selected by health plans. 
The cumulative effect of this intensifying patient safety regulation 
is to create powerful incentives for providers to achieve patient safety 
targets.  The mandates imposed on insurers who want to sell insur-
ance in the health exchanges moves them into a quasi-regulatory role, 
defined by federal rules, rather than by a range of largely unsuccessful 
 
181 Id. sec. 1001, § 2717(a)(1)(A)–(D), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-17(a)(1)(A)–(D). 
182 Id. § 1311(g), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(g) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
183 Id. § 1311(g)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(g)(1)(C). 
184 Id. § 1311(h)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(h)(1)(A). 
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cost control devices that proliferated during the heyday of health 
maintenance organizations.185 
V.  COORDINATING AND INTEGRATING CARE 
PPACA is perhaps most creative in its funding of innovations in 
delivery system models.  The Act offers a range of models, coupled 
with financial incentives, to move health care delivery away from the 
fragmenting forces of fee-for-service medicine.186  As David Hyman 
notes, “Compared to other industries that deal with comparably com-
plex products, health care delivery is extremely fragmented.”187  Hy-
man further observes, “Fragmentation manifests itself across every 
practice setting, in every state, for all types of patients—and where it 
occurs, it contributes to higher costs and lower quality.”188  We pay pro-
viders for what they do, not what they accomplish in terms of good out-
comes and patient improvement.  PPACA offers provisions that pro-
mote both coordination of care and integration of care.189  It moves 
Medicare from its traditional model of fee-for-service payment toward a 
model of incentivized and coordinated care.  The Act offers funding 
for a range of demonstration projects and pilots on the theory that 
grassroots experimentation is needed to see which delivery model 
works best in different settings.190  Several provisions illustrate the strat-
egy underpinning PPACA’s quality provisions. 
 
185 For a discussion of the full range of tools used by managed care plans in the 
1980s and into the 1990s, see generally Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations 
and Patient Injury:  Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419 (1997). 
186 See generally THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE:  CAUSES AND SOLU-
TIONS (Einer R. Elhauge ed., 2010) (collecting essays on health care fragmentation, a 
situation where multiple decisionmakers make health care decisions which would be 
better handled by unified decisionmaking). 
187 David A. Hyman, Health Care Fragmentation:  We Get What We Pay For, in id. at 21, 21. 
188 Id. at 22. 
189 See generally Alain Enthoven, Curing Fragmentation with Integrated Delivery Systems:  
What They Do, What Has Blocked Them, Why We Need Them, and How to Get There from Here 
(defining and describing integration as the opposite of fragmentation and proposing 
ways to achieve greater integration), in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE:  
CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 186, at 61, 63-68, 77-85. 
190 See, e.g., Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, at 34, 35-
36.  Gawande uses the United States Department of Agriculture farm demonstration 
projects as an example of a productive government role in a highly fragmented indus-
try and explains that “[t]he government never took over agriculture, but the govern-
ment didn’t leave it alone, either.  It shaped a feedback loop of experiment and learn-
ing and encouragement for farmers across the country.”  Id.  PPACA, as Gawande 
notes, adopts much the same strategy of testing virtually every idea in health services 
research and evaluating the results constantly.  Id. at 38, 40.  He writes, “Government 
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A.  Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
Centers can fund research, disseminate findings, and create a 
powerful force for the diffusion of effective models.  Section 3021 of 
PPACA establishes a new Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innova-
tion (CMI) within CMS.191  The CMI will test innovative payment and 
delivery service models within the Medicare and Medicaid programs 
that are to reduce program expenditures while simultaneously main-
taining or improving quality of care for beneficiaries.192  The HHS 
Secretary is charged with selecting models that not only reduce costs 
and enhance the quality of care, but also improve “the coordination, 
quality, and efficiency of health care services.”193  The models will be 
selected by the HHS Secretary based on demonstrated evidence that 
“the model addresses a defined population for which there are deficits 
in care leading to poor clinical outcomes or potentially avoidable ex-
penditures.”194  PPACA lists a variety of potential models to be tested195 
that will vary in focus from improving the management and coordina-
tion of care for chronic care patients,196 to implementing widespread 
use of evidence-based medicine,197 to moving physician payments away 
from the fee-for-service paradigm.198 
After the CMI has tested and evaluated the various models de-
scribed in PPACA, the HHS Secretary will have the ability to extend 
successful models, including implementation on a nationwide basis, if 
they have demonstrated the ability to reduce spending while improv-
ing, or at least not reducing, the quality of care.199 
The purpose of the CMI will be to research, develop, test, and ex-
pand innovative payment and delivery arrangements both to improve 
the quality and to reduce the cost of care provided to patients in each 
 
has a crucial role to play here—not running the system but guiding it, by looking for 
the best strategies and practices and finding ways to get them adopted, county by coun-
ty.”  Id. at 38. 
191 PPACA sec. 3021(a), § 1115A(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(a)(1) (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id., § 1115A(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(b)(2)(A). 
195 Id., § 1115A(b)(2)(B)(i)–(xviii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(i)–(xviii). 
196 Id., § 1115A(b)(2)(B)(iii), (v), (viii), (xiv), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(iii), 
(v), (viii), (xiv). 
197 Id., § 1115A(b)(2)(B)(iii), (xii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(iii), (xii). 
198 Id., § 1115A(b)(2)(B)(i), (vi), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(i)(vi). 
199 Id., § 1115A(c)(1)(A)–(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(c)(1)(A)–(B). 
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program.200  Dedicated funding is provided to allow for testing of 
models that require benefits not currently covered by Medicare.201  
Because centers such as the CMI can channel millions of dollars to-
ward research and expansion of payment and delivery reforms, their 
output is likely to be influential on the future of medical practice. 
B.  Health Care Innovation Zones 
Subsection 3021(a) aims to create such zones, comprised of “groups 
of providers that include a teaching hospital, physicians, and other clini-
cal entities[] that . . . [can] deliver a full spectrum of integrated and 
comprehensive health care services to applicable individuals.”202 
C.  Accountable Care Organizations  
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) have been one of the 
most discussed features of PPACA.  Section 3022, the “Medicare 
Shared Savings Program,” creates a program that “promotes accoun-
tability for a patient population and coordinates items and services 
under parts A and B, and encourages investment in infrastructure and 
redesigned care processes for high quality and efficient service deli-
very.”203  As defined by PPACA, ACOs are “groups of providers of ser-
vices and suppliers who work together to manage and coordinate care 
for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries.”204  ACOs typically will be a 
 
200 Id., § 1115A(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(a)(1). 
201 Id., § 1115A(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(f). 
202 Id., § 1115A(b)(2)(B)(xviii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(xviii). 
203 Id., sec. 3022, § 1899(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1395j j j (a)(1) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
204 Id., § 1899(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395j j j (a)(1)(A).  See generally Elliott S. 
Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations:  The Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 
26 HEALTH AFF. w44, w51-w53 (2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/ 
26/1/w44.full.pdf+html (arguing for the use of ACOs at the level of “extended hospit-
al medical staff ” as a way to better coordinate patient care); Stephen M. Shortell & 
Lawrence P. Casalino, Health Care Reform Requires Accountable Care Systems, 300 JAMA 95, 
97 (2008) (discussing the potential for ACOs to be designed to create value by improv-
ing patient outcomes while simultaneously reducing costs).  Much of the formative 
work of ACOs can be traced to the Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical 
Practice headed by Dr. Elliott Fisher and Dr. James Weinstein.  See Elliott S. Fisher et 
al., Fostering Accountable Health Care:  Moving Forward in Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. w219, 
w220, w227 (2009), http://contenthealthaffairs.org/content/28/2/w219.full.pdf+ 
html (proposing Medicare-payment reform through ACOs wherein coordination of 
patient care would be prioritized and financially rewarded); see also The Brookings-
Dartmouth Accountable Care Organization Learning Network, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORG. 
LEARNING NETWORK, https://xteam.brookings.edu/bdacoln/Documents/Network% 
20Overview.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (providing resources on ACOs).  The Medi-
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collection of primary care physicians, specialists, and potentially other 
health professionals (and may include hospitals) who accept joint re-
sponsibility for the quality and cost of care provided to their pa-
tients.205  If the ACO meets certain targets, its members receive a fi-
nancial bonus.206  At the heart of the ACO concept is the expectation 
that when groups of providers are collectively accountable for meeting 
cost and quality targets, internal peer review and peer pressure will 
drive the identification and implementation of best practices systemi-
cally, which in turn could lead to better cost controls and outcomes.207  
Models include more than five different types of practice arrange-
ments, such as integrated or organized delivery systems, multispecialty 
group practices, physician-hospital organizations, independent-
practice associations, and “virtual” physician organizations.208 
ACOs will most likely operate as mini-health plans, building the 
infrastructure to manage utilization and ensure quality-care delivery.  
To establish targets, cost trends, and provider-payment and incentive-
distribution models, ACOs will require sophisticated financial and ac-
tuarial analyses.  To control demand and improve the quality of care 
delivery, ACOs will need to have the tools, processes, and reporting 
for chronic-disease management, complex-case management, and 
wellness-prevention services.  To control medically unnecessary servic-
es, ACOs will need to have the tools, processes, and reporting for 
preauthorization, hospital utilization review, high-tech radiology man-
agement, specialty referral management, and pharmacy management. 
ACOs present a positive coordination model, but their success is 
hardly guaranteed.  They look like a new and improved version of the 
best managed care organizations of old, based on the capitation mod-
 
care Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has also provided extensive analysis of 
the ACO concept.  See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS:  
IMPROVING INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 39-56 (2009), available at 
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun09_EntireReport.pdf (developing an ACO 
model as a recommendation for reforming Medicare’s health care delivery system). 
205 See Timothy L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations—The Fork in the Road, 364 
NEW ENG. J. MED. e1(1), e1(1)-(2) (2011), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/ 
NEJMp1013404 (discussing the benefits and concerns surrounding the implementa-
tion of ACO reform measures). 
206 See Mark McClellan et al., A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice, 
29 HEALTH AFF. 982, 983 (2010) (discussing different ACO payment models). 
207 See Stephen M. Shortell et al., How the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
Should Test Accountable Care Organizations, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1293, 1294 (2010) (arguing 
that ACOs could result in more cost-effective health care in large part because of the 
increased coordination among clinician teams that ACOs would induce). 
208 Id. 
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el.  Risk-bearing, provider-sponsored organizations in the managed 
care era were poorly equipped to manage care or risk, and employers 
and consumers demonstrated a strong preference for unimpeded 
(i.e., “free”) choice of providers.  The shared-savings model also pro-
vides only weak incentives to bring together hospitals and physicians 
that have a strong interest in preserving the status quo.209 
D.  Performance-Based Care Coordination 
Section 3021 of PPACA provides a number of possible coordination 
reforms.  These innovative payment and delivery arrangements include 
the promotion of various models of integration that reduce or elimi-
nate fee-for-service payment systems; for example, patient-centered 
medical home models and other models “transition primary care prac-
tices away from fee-for-service based reimbursement and toward com-
prehensive payment or salary-based payment.”210  Other models include 
direct contracting with groups of providers to promote new delivery 
models “through risk-based comprehensive payment or salary-based 
payment”211 and coordinated-care models that “transition health care 
providers away from fee-for-service based reimbursement and toward 
salary-based payment.”212  A particularly intriguing model explicitly al-
lows for testing of “all-payer payment reform for the medical care of res-
idents of the States.”213  Physicians will earn a bonus for curtailing 
growth in the cost of health services by better managing treatment 
across care settings and by pursuing quality benchmark targets.214  A 
care-coordination model may be structured differently from an ACO 
and may also use different methods to calculate shared savings. 
 
209 See Jeff Goldsmith, The Accountable Care Organization:  Not Ready For Prime Time, 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 17, 2009), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/08/17/the-
accountable-care-organization-not-ready-for-prime-time (arguing that ACOs would create 
huge problems similar to those in the wake of the Clinton-era health care mergers and 
consolidations). 
210 PPACA sec. 3021(a), § 1115A(b)(2)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(i) 
(West Supp. 1A 2010). 
211 Id., § 1115A(b)(2)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
212 Id., § 1115A(b)(2)(B)(iv), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(iv). 
213 Id., § 1115A(b)(2)(B)(xi), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(xi). 
214 Id. sec. 3022, § 1899, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395j j j (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
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E.  Payment Bundling 
Section 2023, “Payment Bundling,” constitutes another essential 
piece of PPACA’s incentive program.215  Under such a program, similar 
services are grouped together and are compensated using a single or 
global payment.  Services can be grouped according to the care pro-
vided by a single doctor or multiple doctors.  Section 3023 mandates a 
pilot program on payment bundling that integrates hospital care for a 
Medicare beneficiary based on episodes of care “in order to improve 
the coordination, quality, and efficiency of health care services.”216  An 
episode of care is a period of time that includes three days prior to 
admission to a hospital for a condition, the length of stay in the hospit-
al, and thirty days after discharge.217  The nature of the conditions that 
can be bundled will be determined by the HHS Secretary.218 
Bundled payments must include “payment for the furnishing of 
applicable services and other appropriate services, such as care coor-
dination, medication reconciliation, discharge planning, transitional 
care services, and other patient-centered activities as determined ap-
propriate by the Secretary”219 and will cover comprehensively the costs 
of those services.  Payments will be made to entities who participate in 
the pilot program when they provide these services to individuals dur-
ing an episode of care.220 
This bundling concept is similar to the Diagnostic-Related Group 
(DRG) payment model Medicare uses for hospital payments.221  It is 
 
215 Id. sec. 3023, § 1866D, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4. 
216 Id., § 1866D(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4(a)(1). 
217 Id., § 1866D(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)–(III), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)–(III). 
218 Id., § 1866D(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4(a)(2)(B).  The factors the Secre-
tary must consider when selecting these conditions include (1) “[w]hether the condi-
tions selected include a mix of chronic and acute conditions”; (2) “[w]hether the con-
ditions selected include a mix of surgical and medical conditions”; (3) whether the 
conditions provide “an opportunity for providers . . . and suppliers to improve the 
quality of care furnished[,] while reducing total expenditures”; (4) whether the condi-
tions have sufficient variation in the number of readmissions and amount of post-acute 
care spending; and (5) which conditions are most amenable to bundling.  Id., 
§ 1866D(a)(2)(B)(i)–(vi), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4(a)(2)(B)(i)–(vi). 
219 Id., § 1866D(c)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4(c)(3)(B). 
220 Id., § 1866D(c)(3)(C)(i)(I)–(II), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4(c)(3)(C)(i)(I)–(II). 
221 Congress mandated the DRG prospective payment system in 1982 to control 
Medicare costs.  This system changes payment from a highly inflationary fee-for-service 
approach to an individual reimbursement mechanism, which divides inpatient admis-
sion cases into categories called diagnostic-related groups (DRGs).  DRG Classification 
and Weighting Factors, 42 C.F.R. § 412.60 (2010).  Medicare then pays hospitals a flat 
per-case charge based on the particular DRG.  The goal is to reward efficient hospitals 
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more expansive, however, in including all services provided to a patient 
during the episode of care.  As with other coordination initiatives in 
PPACA, bundling payments for specific procedures is supposed to en-
courage providers to work together, reduce duplication of services and 
procedures, and incentivize hospitals, physicians, and other providers to 
improve the quality and efficiency of care. 
F.  Patient-Centered Medical Homes (PCMHs) 
The medical home concept centers on primary care physicians and 
the comprehensive improvement of primary care delivery.  PPACA car-
ries forward this idea where physicians receive additional monthly 
payments for effectively using health information technology and oth-
er innovations to monitor, coordinate, and manage care.222  The “med-
ical home” is generally understood to combine services of health care 
providers with care delivery in a form that is accessible and coordi-
nated in a community context.  Medical homes thus help the patient 
(and physician) navigate the confusing and fragmented delivery sys-
tem.223  The medical home concept has a long history, going back to 
experiments in coordinating care in the 1970s and pediatric medical 
home demonstrations in more recent years.224  Its lineage also includes 
the experience of primary care case management approaches under-
taken by many managed care organizations in the 1990s.225  Although 
proponents claim that the PCMH can be a vital tool in establishing a 
true “system” for health delivery while using an individualized, patient-
focused approach to care, doubts persist about how they may evolve.  
Robert Berenson and his coauthors question small primary care prac-
tices’ capacity to undertake responsibility for comprehensive care 
 
and create incentives for inefficient hospitals to improve.  See generally Office of Inspec-
tor Gen., OEI-09-00-00200, MEDICARE HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM:  HOW 
DRG RATES ARE CALCULATED AND UPDATED (2001), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/ 
oei/reports/oei-09-00-00200.pdf.   
222 See Health Policy Brief:  Patient-Centered Medical Homes, HEALTH AFF., 1 (Sept. 14, 
2010), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_ 
25.pdf (“Supporters [of health care reform] hope patient-centered medical homes will 
help refocus the U.S. health care system on the benefits of primary care.”). 
223 Id. 
224 Robert A. Berenson et al., A House Is Not a Home:  Keeping Patients at the Center of 
Practice Redesign, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1219, 1223 (2008).  For more information about the 
implementation of medical homes and related national initiatives, see generally Na-
tional Initiatives Overview, NAT’L CENTER FOR MED. HOME IMPLEMENTATION, 
http://www.medicalhomeinfo.org/national (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
225 Berenson, supra note 224, at 1223. 
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management pointing out that new responsibilities for risk assessment 
and coordination across specialties and facilities might derogate their 
“patient centeredness” in delivering primary care.226 
VI. EXPANDING PROVIDER RESPONSIBILITY 
PPACA has several sections that will significantly expand provider 
responsibility and affect their liability exposure, even though the only 
two provisions in the Act that explicitly have a liability dimension deal 
with decision aids for patient decisionmaking227 and the tort demon-
stration project section.228 
A.  Explicit Liability Provisions in PPACA 
1.  Decision Aids 
PPACA adopts the use of decision aids for “preference-sensitive 
care.”229  Preference-sensitive care refers to care situations in which the 
clinical evidence does not clearly support one treatment option over 
another, confronting the patient and provider with significant tradeoffs 
among different outcomes for each treatment.230  The goal is to give pa-
tients full information about treatment tradeoffs and ensure that pa-
tient preferences are incorporated into the treatment plan.231  “Decision 
 
226 Id. at 1226.  “Health homes” consist of a designated health care provider and a 
team of health care professionals working with designated caregivers to provide Medi-
caid beneficiaries with a comprehensive array of health services including care coordi-
nation and referral services.  PPACA sec. 2703(a), § 1945(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396w-4(a) 
(West Supp. 1B 2010).  The Act also provides grants and other funding for “health 
teams” transitioning to become medical homes (meeting an extensive list of require-
ments).  Id. § 3502(c)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 256a-1 (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
227 PPACA sec. 3506, § 936, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-36. 
228 Id. sec. 10607, § 399V-4, 42 U.S.C.A. § 280g-15. 
229 Id. sec. 3506, § 936, 42 U.S.C.A § 299b-36.   
230 John E. Wennberg & Philip G. Peters, Jr., Unwarranted Variations in the Quality of 
Health Care:  Can the Law Help Medicine Provide a Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 925, 928-30 (2002).  PPACA defines “preference-sensitive care” as 
medical care for which the clinical evidence does not clearly support one 
treatment option such that the appropriate course of treatment depends on 
the values of the patient or the preferences of the patient, caregivers or au-
thorized representatives regarding the benefits, harms and scientific evidence 
for each treatment option, the use of such care should depend on the in-
formed patient choice among clinically appropriate treatment options. 
Id. sec. 3506, § 936(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-36(b)(2).   
231 See Wennberg & Peters, supra note 230, at 934-95.   
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aids are decision support tools that provide patients with detailed and 
specific information on options and outcomes, help them clarify their 
values, and guide them through the decision making process.”232 
Such decision aids are intended to inform decisionmaking with 
regard to preference-sensitive care.  Advocates contend that decision 
aids improve patient knowledge and generate realistic expectations of 
the benefits and harms of options; lower patient feelings of being un-
informed; and reduce patient passivity in decision making.233  They al-
so help patients with chronic diseases feel socially supported and po-
tentially improve their behavioral and clinical outcomes.234  Decision 
aid examples include treatments for prostate surgery or treatments for 
heart disease, for which several clinical approaches are possible (e.g., 
medication, surgery, or watchful waiting).235  Decision aid tools typical-
ly include DVDs that explain clinical choices, brochures, and other 
methods of presenting useful information to patients.236 
 
232 Elie A. Akl et al., A Decision Aid for COPD patients Considering Inhaled Steroid Ther-
apy:  Development and Before and After Pilot Testing, BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION 
MAKING 2 (May 15, 2007), http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/7/12.  PPACA 
defines “patient decision aid” as “an educational tool that helps patients, caregivers or 
authorized representatives understand and communicate their beliefs and preferences 
related to their treatment options, and to decide with their health care provider what 
treatments are best for them based on their treatment options, scientific evidence, cir-
cumstances, beliefs, and preferences.”  PPACA sec. 3506, § 936(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 299b-36(b)(1).  Under PPACA, patient decision aids:   
(A) shall be designed to engage patients, caregivers, and authorized repre-
sentatives in informed decisionmaking with health care providers; 
(B) shall present up-to-date clinical evidence about the risks and benefits of 
treatment options in a form and manner that is age-appropriate and can be 
adapted for patients, caregivers, and authorized representatives from a variety 
of cultural and educational backgrounds to reflect the varying needs of con-
sumers and diverse levels of health literacy; 
(C) shall, where appropriate, explain why there is a lack of evidence to sup-
port one treatment option over another; and 
(D) shall address health care decisions across the age span, including those af-
fecting vulnerable populations including children. 
Id., § 936(d)(2)(A)–(D), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-36(d)(2)(A)–(D). 
233 Elie A. Akl et al., supra note 232, at 2. 
234 Id.  
235 For examples of decision aids for such diseases with treatment options, see Deci-
sion Aid Library, DARTMOUTH-HITCHCOCK, http://patients.dartmouth-hitchcock.org/ 
shared_decision_making/decision_aid_library.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011); see also 
Patient Decision Aids, FOUND. FOR INFORMED MED. DECISION MAKING, http:// 
www.informedmedicaldecisions.org/patient_decision_aids.html (last visited Mar. 15, 
2011) (describing and listing patient decision aids). 
236 See Michael J. Barry, Health Decision Aids to Facilitate Shared Decision Making in 
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Washington State has already amended its informed consent sta-
tute to fund demonstration projects and to incorporate decision aids 
into state informed consent law.237  The legislation requires the state 
health care authority to implement a shared-decisionmaking demon-
stration project, to be conducted at one or more multi-specialty group 
practices.238  The demonstration project will incorporate decision aids 
into clinical practice to assess the effect of shared decisionmaking on 
health care quality and cost.239 
The PPACA mandate to use such certified decision aids introduc-
es a federal requirement that overlays the common law of informed 
consent.  Such decision aids must replace the normal process of in-
formed consent disclosure, at first in Medicare health plans, but rea-
listically in most settings as providers strive for consistency in their in-
formed consent approaches.  PPACA therefore sets the standard of 
care for disclosure of risks and benefits of procedures and requires 
use of the decision aid in order to satisfy this informational standard.  
If the provider does not use available decision aids, and a patient suf-
fers injury, the patient has a legal claim that the provider breached 
the standard of care by failing to follow the statutory requirement.  
Decision aids would then become the community standard for infor-
mation disclosure.240 
2.  Liability-Reform Demonstration Projects 
PPACA promotes state demonstration programs that are limited 
in their scope by the terms of grants to the states.  Tort reform was 
never seriously considered as a central part of health care reform, in 
part because cost savings from reform were not expected to be sub-
 
Office Practice, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 127, 127 (2002) (“Health decision aids are 
designed to facilitate shared decision making by helping patients and their physicians 
choose among reasonable clinical options.” (citations omitted)). 
237 Wash. Rev. Code. §§ 7.70.060, 41.05.033 (West, Westlaw through 2011 legisla-
tion effective through April 19, 2011).  
238 Id. § 41.05.033(2). 
239 Id.  While provisions of PPACA do not describe how the burden of proof might 
be altered, if at all, by requirements that such aids be used, Washington State requires 
that such aids be used, once developed and certified.  Id. § 7.70.060.  This creates a 
presumption of informed consent if a practitioner uses decision aids, and the pre-
sumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.  Id.  
240 Failure to follow the statutory requirement may even give rise to the argument 
of negligence per se.   
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stantial.241  The Senate defined the parameters of tort reform as 
bounded by a search for effective alternative dispute resolution sys-
tems.  Section 6801 of PPACA states that 
[i]t is the sense of the Senate that— 
(1) health care reform presents an opportunity to address issues related 
to medical malpractice and medical liability insurance; 
(2) States should be encouraged to develop and test alternatives to the 
existing civil litigation system as a way of improving patient safety, reduc-
ing medical errors, encouraging the efficient resolution of disputes, in-
creasing the availability of prompt and fair resolution of disputes, and 
improving access to liability insurance, while preserving an individual’s 
right to seek redress in court; and 
 
241 See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Orrin G. 
Hatch, U.S. Senator (Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/ 
doc10641.  The letter represented the CBO’s official response to Senator Hatch’s “re-
quest for an updated analysis of the effects of proposals to limit costs related to medi-
cal malpractice (‘tort reform’).”  Id. at 1.  The CBO began with the assumption that 
“[t]ort reform could affect costs for health care both directly and indirectly:  directly, 
by lowering premiums for medical liability insurance; and indirectly, by reducing the 
use of diagnostic tests and other health care services when providers recommend those 
services principally to reduce their potential exposure to lawsuits.”  Id.  The CBO esti-
mated costs savings from various tort reforms, such as caps on noneconomic damages; 
caps on punitive damages; modification of the “collateral source” rule; more restrictive 
statutes of limitations; and replacement of joint-and-several liability with a fair-share 
rule limiting a defendant’s liability to the percentage of the final award that was equal 
to his or her share of responsibility for the injury.  Id. at 1-2.  The CBO also estimated 
that such reforms would reduce medical malpractice premiums by about ten percent.  
Id. at 2.  The CBO further calculated that in 2009 the direct costs to providers for med-
ical malpractice liability, including premiums, awards, settlements, and administrative 
costs, would be around $35 billion, or roughly two percent of total health care expend-
itures.  Id.  A savings of ten percent in premiums plus costs would therefore, in the 
CBO’s words, “reduce total national health care expenditures by about 0.2 percent.”  
Id. at 2-3.  This is hardly a significant savings. 
 In addition, the CBO noted the possibility of measurable indirect savings from 
“reduced utilization of health care services,” although particular reforms might have 
different effects on physician incentives.  Id. at 3.  Adding these savings to the reform 
savings would reduce total national health care spending by about half a percent, or 
approximately $11 billion in 2009.  Id. 
 Finally, the CBO noted that much uncertainty remains about the possible negative 
effect on health outcomes of limiting the rights of injured patients to sue for injuries 
from medical errors.  Id. at 5.  It noted that the studies are in conflict, ranging from an 
estimate that a 10% reduction in costs would increase the overall mortality rate by 
0.2%, to an estimate of no serious adverse outcomes for patient health.  Id.  The tort 
reformers’ hope that extensive reforms could be sold as cost reduction, as part of the 
overall PPACA package, was limited by this CBO analysis. 
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(3) Congress should consider establishing a State demonstration pro-
gram to evaluate alternatives to the existing civil litigation system with re-
spect to the resolution of medical malpractice claims.
242
 
The primary liability reform provision in PPACA is section 10607.243  
Under it, the HHS Secretary may award demonstration grants for up to 
five years to states to explore alternatives to  tort litigation for resolving 
claims filed against health care providers or organizations.244  PPACA 
specifies that the programs should resolve disputes over patient injuries 
and promote a reduction in medical errors “by encouraging the collec-
tion and analysis of patient safety data related to disputes resolved un-
der subparagraph (A) by organizations that engage in efforts to im-
prove patient safety and the quality of health care.”245 
States seeking grants must demonstrate how their model 
(A) makes the medical liability system more reliable by increasing the 
availability of prompt and fair resolution of disputes; 
(B) encourages the efficient resolution of disputes; 
(C) encourages the disclosure of health care errors; 
(D) enhances patient safety by detecting, analyzing, and helping to re-
duce medical errors and adverse events; 
(E) improves access to liability insurance; 
(F) fully informs patients about the differences in the alternative and 
current tort litigation; 
(G) provides patients the ability to opt out of or voluntarily withdraw 
from participating in the alternative at any time and to pursue other op-
tions, including litigation, outside the alternative; 
(H) would not conflict with State law at the time of the application in a 
way that would prohibit the adoption of an alternative to current tort lit-
igation; and 
(I) would not limit or curtail a patient’s existing legal rights, ability to 
file a claim in or access a State’s legal system, or otherwise abrogate a pa-




242 PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6801, 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010). 
243 Id. sec. 10607, § 399V-4, 42 U.S.C.A. § 280g-15. 
244 Id., § 399V-4(a)–(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 280g-15(a)–(b). 
245 Id., § 399V-4(c)(1)(A)–(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 280g-15(c)(1)(A)–(B). 
246 Id., § 399V-4(c)(2)(A)–(I), 42 U.S.C.A. § 280g-15(c)(2)(A)–(I). 
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B.  Streams of Liability Risk Under PPACA 
PPACA creates four streams of pressure that converge toward 
measurable and specific standards of care in practice.    First, outcome 
measures will be researched, developed, and disseminated.247  Second, 
under Subtitle F, PPACA mandates the AHRQ director—in collabora-
tion with other federal agencies—to develop “innovative methodolo-
gies and strategies” for improving patient safety and health care out-
comes.248  AHRQ’s Center for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety 
will disseminate best practices249 and develop mechanisms for deliver-
ing health care reliably, safely, and efficiently; translate evidence into 
widely applicable practice recommendations; and identify and miti-
gate hazards by analyzing and responding to patient safety data.250  
This is quite a list, and it is likely to force hospital patient safety and 
compliance officers into overtime as they struggle to absorb new find-
ings.  The use of “practice recommendations” approximates standard-
setting for physicians and puts a heavier burden of justification on 
them to deviate from what lawyers will argue is a standard of care. 
Third, research on outcome measures and best practices will be 
used to create clinical practice guidelines.251  Fourth, outcomes, best 
practices, and guidelines will be rapidly disseminated to practice set-
tings.  Physician performance information will be available to consum-
ers through website information,252 just as hospital and nursing home 
comparative data are now.  Such information will include measures 
collected under the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative and also as-
sessments of such factors as efficiency, safety, and effectiveness.253 
The Center for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety will push 
for adoption of best practices to improve the quality, safety, and effi-
ciency of health care delivery services.254  Findings will be disseminated 
through multiple media—linked with the Office of the National 
Coordinator of Health Information Technology—and used to “inform 
the activities of the health information technology extension pro-
 
247 Id. sec. 10303(a), § 931(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-31(f); see also supra Section I.B 
(discussing PPACA’s provisions relating to outcome measures in greater depth). 
248 Id. sec. 3501, § 933(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-33(a). 
249 Id., § 933(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-33(d). 
250 Id., § 933(c)(2)(E)–(F), (H)–(I), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-33(c)(2)(E)–(F), (H)–(I). 
251  PPACA requires the HHS Secretary to identify existing and new clinical practice 
guidelines. Id. sec. 10303(c), § 304(b)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-33.  
252 Id. § 10331(a), § 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-5(a) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
253 Id. 
254 Id. sec. 3501, § 933(b)(8), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-33(b)(8) (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
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gram . . . as well as any relevant standards, certification criteria, or im-
plementation specifications.”255  A Patient-Centered Outcomes Re-
search Institute will provide information to patients, providers, pur-
chasers, and policymakers regarding disease management and recent 
research findings.256 
The effect of the cumulative PPACA requirements will be to force 
the rapid diffusion of new standards into practice.  First, millions of 
federal dollars are pouring into the research world to analyze the prac-
tice-outcome linkage for most medical practices and what best practic-
es should be.257 Second, PPACA mandates dissemination in a variety of 
ways, including websites, pay-for-performance reforms, and models of 
integrated practice.  New payment reforms in particular will tie physi-
cian performance to these measures, particularly in ACOs, medical 
homes, and other new integrated modes of practice whose creation 
PPACA incentivizes.  Best practices—grounded in research and made 
accessible and transparent to providers, patients, and payers—will start 
to squeeze out medical practice variation in clinical practice. 
1.  Physician Liability 
The liability effect of reducing variations in medical practice is 
clear:  defenses under existing state liability rules (e.g., respectable 
minority defenses, variations in practice, and proximate causation) 
will narrow as practice choices also narrow.258  The physician who does 
not keep up with new research will not only suffer income loss; she 
will also suffer a higher risk of liability for failing to conform to what 
becomes the new standard of care.259  Such practice guidelines and 
best practices will be used in malpractice suits, in spite of PPACA’s 
modest attempts to limit their use.  The section of PPACA that creates 
the PCOR Institute specifies that its findings must be rapidly dissemi-
 
255 Id., § 933(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-33(d). 
256 Id. sec. 6301, § 1181(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(c). 
257 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, tit. VIII, 
123 Stat. 115, 176-77. 
258 See generally FURROW ET AL., supra note 18, at 381-425 (surveying various de-
fenses to medical malpractice suits). 
259 Mello and others argue that there are a variety of reasons why physicians resist 
adhering to suggested guidelines.  See, e.g., Mello, supra note 43, at 680-83 (explaining 
that physicians are not aware of best practices, do not like them, do not feel they are 
applicable in a particular case, and/or lack the resources to implement them).  But 
findings generated by CER are likely to take the wind out of physician resistance, given 
better scientific underpinnings for medical practice. 
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nated to clinicians, presumably so that they can adopt them.260  While 
PPACA specifies that such research findings do not include “practice 
guidelines, coverage recommendations, payment, or policy recom-
mendations,”261 this is hardly sufficient to keep such findings out of lit-
igation over medical errors.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers will use the findings as 
at least some evidence of a standard of care, and potentially powerful 
evidence at that.  This is one of the costs of improving medical prac-
tice by narrowing practice variation and medical uncertainty.  And as 
American physicians move more and more into integrated systems 
and hospitals and away from small private practices, their liability is 
likely to be shared with the health care systems.262 
2.  Institutional Liability 
If we assume that health reform will achieve some reorganization 
of health care delivery, then within a few years ACOs will be formed, 
comprehensive patient bundling will be implemented in many hospit-
als, and salary-based payment systems will proliferate.  These reforms 
will accomplish several objectives simultaneously:  they will move more 
physicians from solo or small-group practice into salaried positions in 
a group model or hospitals; they will shift power toward enterprises 
that can buy and coordinate the technologies—from electronic health 
records to case management strategies—to meet the demands of the 
federal government; and they will therefore turn more providers into 
employee-agents of institutional providers instead of independent 
contractors.  While the payment-reform measures in PPACA begin 
with physicians, it will primarily be institutional providers that will 
create systems. 
If these various reforms, incentives, and forces converge, institution-
al providers will become directly liable for patient injury as well as vica-
riously liable for injuries caused by physicians, since agency law will carry 
liability upstream from agent to principal.  Physicians will be much more 
integrated in the system, whether or not they are salaried, and any ar-
gument that they are independent contractors will evaporate.263 
 
260 PPACA sec. 6301, § 1181(d)(8), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(8). 
261 Id., § 1181(d)(8)(A)(iv), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(8)(A)(iv). 
262 I do not address the problem of physician resistance to patient safety initiatives.  
For background on this problem, see Behaviors That Undermine a Culture of Safety, SENTI-
NEL EVENT ALERT (The Joint Comm’n, Oakbrook Terrace, Ill.), July 9, 2008, available at 
http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_40.pdf. 
263 For a discussion of PPACA’s failure to legislate any liability reforms, see Thomas 
L. Hafemeister & Joshua Hinckley-Porter, The Health Care Reform Act of 2010 and Medical 
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Second, even if ACOs and other entities operate without a hospit-
al as part of the organization, they are now health care providers, sub-
ject to liability just as a hospital or managed care organization, on 
both vicarious liability and direct negligence principles.  Corporate 
negligence principles will likely apply to integrated organizations that 
manage care, whether a patient home, an ACO, or some other deli-
very form that PPACA creates.  American courts have proved willing to 
look beyond the hospital form in deciding whether a health care entity 
might be liable for corporate negligence.  For example, in Gianquitti v. 
Atwood Medical Associates, Ltd., the court held that a professional medi-
cal group practice that provides on-call medical care to its patients if 
and when they are hospitalized could be liable for corporate negli-
gence if it lacked a formal backup system.264  In another case, Davis v. 
Gish, the court noted the kinds of activities that would turn a profes-
sional group or a physicians’ practice group into an entity subject to 
corporate negligence.265  The entity would, like an HMO, “involve [it-
self] daily in decisions affecting [its] subscriber’s medical care.  These 
decisions may, among others, limit the length of hospital stays, restrict 
the use of specialists, prohibit or limit post-hospital care, restrict 
access to therapy, or prevent rendering of emergency room care.”266  
The entity must have general responsibility for “arranging and coor-
dinating the total health care of its patients.”267  It must take “an active 
role in patients’ care.”268 
 
Malpractice Liability:  Worlds in Collision?, 64 SMU L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2011), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1755028.  Hafemeister and Hickley-Porter explain, 
[S]ome have argued that because the PPACA does so little to directly address 
malpractice and malpractice litigation-related concerns, its enactment will ac-
tually result in an increase in the number of malpractice cases and related 
costs as its provisions come into effect.  As more patient encounters occur per 
year as a result of more insured people seeking medical attention, as a matter 
of course the total number of adverse events may increase, resulting in a 
greater number of medical malpractice suits.  In addition, because the num-
ber of available physicians will remain constant while the number of patients 
able to obtain medical care will increase, this may result in the time and ener-
gy of doctors being stretched to cover more patients, possibly resulting in an 
increased number of mistakes on the part of physicians. 
Id. (manuscript at 21) (citations omitted). 
264 973 A.2d 580, 591-92 (R.I. 2009). 
265 2 Pa. D. & C.5th 154, 157-59 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2007). 
266 Id. at 158 (quoting Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828, 835 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1998)). 
267 Id. at 159. 
268 Id. 
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 Today most physician groups or physician office-based practices 
would not be said to possess such responsibility.  PPACA—with its mil-
lions of dollars in demonstration grants and its new mandates—will fos-
ter new entities that are far more likely to coordinate care than are 
current health care providers.  These new entities will take on new re-
sponsibilities that will make them appropriate defendants in tort litiga-
tion.  Once liability is accepted, then institutions might willingly take 
the next step of responsibility for bad outcomes experienced by their 
patients.  They might consider the warranty of care model offered by 
the Geisinger Clinic.  The Geisinger Clinic, an integrated health care 
delivery system in northeastern Pennsylvania, has a “warranty” program 
which promises patients that forty key processes will be completed 
when they undergo elective coronary-artery bypass graft surgery 
(CABG).269  Geisinger does not guarantee results, but it will cover care 
for post-surgery complications during the first ninety days.270  This is a 
contract counterpart to enterprise liability for hospitals, a proposal of-
ten discussed but never adopted.271  It may be that finally enterprise 
liability will make sense as integration and coordination intensify, and 
outcomes and performance data are generally available to all. 
CONCLUSION 
PPACA will change American health care in many ways, providing 
insurance coverage for many more Americans, expanding Medicaid 
coverage for low-income citizens, and improving the practice of medi-
cine generally.  Practice guidelines and best practices will be devel-
oped, outcomes measured, and tolerance of medical errors and pa-
 
269 Lee, supra note 19, at 531. 
270 Id. 
271 Pure outcome-based enterprise liability proposals have existed in the legal litera-
ture since the 1970s.  See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst & Laurence R. Tancredi, “Medical Ad-
versity Insurance”—A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. HEALTH & SOC’Y 125, 125-26 (1973) (proposing a no-fault 
system for handling unfavorable results of medical care); Clark C. Havighurst, “Medical 
Adversity Insurance”—Has Its Time Come?, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1233, 1253-55 (1975) (describ-
ing a system that would create a schedule of compensable medical injuries in advance, 
regardless of fault, as opposed to a system with case-by-case adjudications for medical 
injuries); Laurence R. Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault Alternative, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 277, 277 (1986) (“A no-fault compensation scheme should rank at the very top 
of a list of long-term solutions to the perceived crisis in medical malpractice.”).  For 
more recent scholarship, see Philip G. Peters, Jr., Resuscitating Hospital Enterprise Liabili-
ty, 73 MO. L. REV. 369, 369 (2008) (“No tort reform has more potential to improve the 
quality of medical care and to reduce the frequency of patient injuries than exclusive 
hospital enterprise liability.”). 
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tient harms reduced.  The result will be a change in practice patterns 
for individual physicians and health care systems as both adapt to what 
is hoped to be a new and improved practice of medicine in the United 
States.  The path to a new efficient health care system will be bumpy:  
physician cooperation is uncertain unless incentives are powerful 
enough; guidelines and effectiveness research may meet resistance; 
the promised coordination innovations may prove to be less successful 
than hoped as providers and insurers struggle to divide up the health 
care pie.  PPACA, for all its many provisions, may lack sufficient regu-
latory muscle, relying on dissemination of research and modest incen-
tives and disincentives to alter provider behavior.  However, while 
many initiatives are still modest in scope, they are likely to intensify 
pressure on both physicians and institutional providers as more and 
more reimbursement is at risk.  If the incentives are properly designed 
and good medical research begins to tell us more about what works 
and what is wasted, then American medicine may become both more 
effective and safer for patients. 
 
